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ABSTRACT 
The use of satellites to support military operations has grown dramatically in 
recent years, which has increased the exposure of military satellite systems to targeting. 
To combat this risk to its space systems, the Department of Defense has prescribed 
increased military space cooperation with the United States’ closest friends and allies.  
This thesis investigates the United States’ history of partnering with three of its closest 
allies—France, Australia, and Japan—since the dawn of the space age to see where the 
best opportunities for enhanced military space cooperation exist today.  It finds that 
changes in the military space organizations, capabilities, and policies of these three allies 
since 2008 have significantly increased the ability of their militaries to collaborate 
fruitfully with the Department of Defense.  Furthermore, aided by the ongoing growth of 
their military space cadres, collaboration with these countries can expand from a 
traditional focus on technical applications into combined education, doctrine, and policy. 
The thesis closes on a cautionary note, arguing that the Department of Defense needs to 
carefully consider how it will develop trust with foreign spacefaring militaries, with the 
Department of Commerce likely to assume responsibility for the foreign engagement 
associated with the United States’ space situational awareness data-sharing agreements 
by 2024. 
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In 2010, the United States pivoted toward increased international collaboration in 
space under the Obama administration. Partnering with responsible nations in space was a 
key tenet of the 2011 National Security Space Strategy.1 Increased partnering with 
responsible nations took on a number of forms during the administration, to include 
reforms to International Trafficking in Arms Regulations and the signing of space 
situational sharing agreements with a total of 63 commercial partners, multi-lateral 
organizations, and countries by early 2016.2 In addition to these two efforts, the 
incorporation of Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand into the 
Combined Space Operations initiative with the United States represented a significant 
nascent effort to create coalition operations in space. Moving toward the current 
administration, the U.S. Department of Defense sought to bring other like-minded allies 
and partners, such as Japan, France, and Germany, into the Combined Space Operations 
initiative.   
The fundamental question this thesis seeks to answer is, “How might the United 
States benefit from coalition operations in space?” While determining how the United 
States can benefit from coalition operations in space with all like-minded countries is 
beyond the scope of this work, the thesis takes on the more modest task of a case study 
approach to examine how the United States can benefit from coalition operations in space 
with three countries—Australia, France, and Japan. 
Studying this particular set of countries is warranted for several reasons. First, each 
country has long-standing security agreements with the United States, but each agreement 
is different. As such, each agreement has unique benefits and drawbacks when it comes to 
cooperation. For example, Australia is a “Five-Eye” country, which facilitates the sharing 
                                                 
1 Defense Department and Office of the Director of National Intelligence, National Security Space 
Strategy (Unclassified Summary) (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, January 2011), 
http://archive.defense.gov/ home/features/2011/0111_nsss/, 5. 
2 Fiscal Year 2017 Budget Request for National Security Space: Hearing before the Armed Services 
Committee, House, 114th Cong., 2nd sess. (March 15, 2016) (statement of Doug Loverro, Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for Space Policy, Department of Defense), 10.   
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of intelligence, but not a NATO ally, which does more to facilitate collaboration in research 
and development.   
Second, each country maintains significant space capabilities of its own, 
capabilities that can increase the United States’ mission capability and resilience capacity 
when operating as a coalition force. In this regard, Australia can be seen as somewhat 
lacking: Unlike Japan and France, Australia has never developed an independent launch 
capability. Of the “Five-Eye” countries covered by the UK-USA agreement, however, 
Australia and the United States have collaborated the most actively in defense related space 
in recent years. In 2013 and 2014, for example, the United States and Australia entered into 
agreements to relocate tracking radars to Australia to better monitor space activities in the 
southern hemisphere.3 Similarly, France is a more interesting case than Germany because 
of France’s early and sustained involvement in military-to-military cooperation in the 
Helios-II satellite program and because it is arguably the leading voice concerning space 
politics in Europe.   
Third, each country has a unique political situation constraining the interaction and 
cooperation it can enter into with the United States. This is clearly exemplified by Japan, 
whose Basic Space Law forbade it from conducting military operations in space prior to 
the law’s revision in 2008. Not until 2015, then, did Japan and the United States sign The 
Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation, which pledged closer military cooperation 
with the United States Department of Defense across a broad spectrum of space mission 
areas.4     
A. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
The 2011 U.S. National Security Space Strategy reflects changes in U.S. 
government thinking about space that continue even today. Recent government analysis of 
space security posits that the strategic environment of space has become “congested, 
contested, and competitive” and that a host of conditions threatens the ability of the 
                                                 
3 H., Fiscal Year 2017 Budget Request, 4–5. 
4 Japanese Ministry of Defense, The Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation, April 27, 2015, 
http://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_act/anpo/shishin_20150427e.html. 
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Department of Defense’s satellite constellations to accomplish their mission in support of 
the joint force. The Obama Administration set forth increasing the “interoperability, 
compatibility, and integration of partner nations into appropriate DoD and IC networks” as 
a strategy to mitigate some of these threats to mission accomplishment.5 While the United 
States has yet to establish all of the conditions necessary to conduct coalition operations in 
space, nearly twenty years of thinking about the strategic imperatives of space has led it to 
pursue coalition operations in space as a policy objective. 
The path toward the first ever National Security Space Strategy began in 1999 when 
the Fiscal Year 2000 National Defense Authorization Act mandated the creation of a 
commission to assess the management and organization of the U.S. national security space 
activities.6 The so-called “Space Commission” that resulted from the authorization act 
found, in early 2001, that the United States critically needed to elevate space on the national 
security agenda.7 Concerns that would later animate the Bush administration’s approach to 
space security were manifest in the report, to include the ability of space to “speed the 
transformation of the U.S. military into a modern force,” the need to shape the regulatory 
environment to ensure U.S. national security interests, and the recognition among potential 
adversaries that U.S. space assets made attractive targets.8 The commission identified five 
matters of key importance as needing the government’s quick attention, two of which 
would directly impact the development of a national security space strategy. The 
commission cited the need for “specific guidance and direction from the very highest 
government levels … to ensure the United States remains the world’s leading space fairing 
nation.”9 It further recognized that the Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central 
                                                 
5 Defense Department and Office of the Director of National Intelligence, National Security Space 
Strategy, 9. 
6 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, Public Law 106–65, 106th Cong., 1st 
sess., January 6, 1999.   
7 Commission to Assess U.S. National Security Space Management and Organization, Report of the 
Commission to Assess U.S. National Security Space Management and Organization, January 11, 2001, 
https://fas.org/spp/military/commission/report.htm.  
8 Commission to Assess, Report of the Commission, 5–7. See the 2002 Annual Defense Report and the 
2006 U.S. National Space Policy for repetition of these themes during the Bush administration.   
9 Commission to Assess, Report of the Commission, 9–10. 
 4 
Intelligence as the two officials primarily responsible for national space programs.  In 
succeeding the Director of Central Intelligence as the head of the U.S. intelligence 
community, as a consequence of the Intelligence Reform and Intelligence Prevention Act 
of 2004, the Director of National Intelligence later assumed overall responsibility for the 
intelligence community’s space programs as well.10 
In 2003, the Government Accountability Office recommended specifically that the 
Department of Defense develop a national security space strategy and plan that would 
enable it to achieve the goals that the 1996 national space policy established for the 
department.11 In 2008, the Government Accountability Office sent a follow-up letter to the 
Senate, explaining that the development of a legitimate national security space strategy 
would require closer collaboration between the intelligence community and the 
Department of Defense than anticipated in 2001, while it further stated that “cultural 
differences” between the intelligence and defense communities was making collaboration 
on such a document difficult.12 As a result, the Government Accountability Office 
recommended that Congress require the Secretary of Defense and the Director of National 
Intelligence to work together to develop and issue a National Security Space Strategy.   
The collaborative effort of the Secretary of Defense and the Director of National 
Intelligence manifested itself in the first ever National Security Space Strategy in 2011. 
This document flows from the United States Space Policy issued in 2010, which places 
greater emphasis on the shared and international use of space more than previous national 
space policies had. The 2011 National Security Space Strategy expresses a preoccupation 
with a strategic space environment that had become “congested, contested, and 
competitive.”         
                                                 
10 Office of the Director of National Intelligence, “ODNI Factsheet,” February 24, 2017, 1, https:// 
www.dni.gov/files/documents/FACTSHEET_ODNI_History_and_Background_2_24-17.pdf. 
11 Government Accountability Office, Defense Space Activities:  Organizational Changes Initiated 
but Further Management Actions Needed, GAO-03-379, April 18, 2003, https://www.gao.gov/new.items/ 
d03379.pdf. 
12 Government Accountability Office, “Letter to the Chairman and Ranking Member of the United 
States Committee on Armed Services,” Subcommittee on Strategic forces dated March 27, 2008, GAO-08-
431R, https://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08431r.pdf. 
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The relatively congested space environment of 2011 and today has resulted from a 
sharp increase in space debris in recent years. Since the dawn of the space age, the number 
of spacefaring nations has increased linearly at a rate of about one nation per year. 
Meanwhile, space debris 10 cm in diameter or larger has increased exponentially from zero 
objects in 1957, to 5,000 objects in 1982, and to approximately 23,000 objects currently.13 
The Chinese government’s use of an anti-satellite weapon to destroy one of its own aging, 
on-orbit weather satellites in 2007 and the collision of an Iridium telecommunications 
satellite with a retired Russian military communications satellite in 2009 contributed 
significantly to the recent increase in space debris. If space debris continues to increase 
exponentially, it could crowd satellites out of affected orbits in the near future.    
While the space environment has become more congested, countries have quickly 
developed an interest in technologies that would allow them to contest operations within 
the space environment as well. This has followed from the United States use of space to 
conduct military operations. From the 1991 Gulf War to Operation Enduring Freedom, 
space operations transitioned from strategic-level integration down to tactical-level 
integration into U.S. military operations.14 Precision navigation and timing, satellite 
communications, space imagery, space weather, and overhead persistent reconnaissance 
have all assumed a direct support role in combat. According to Doug Loverro,  Assistant 
Undersecretary of Defense for Space Policy for the Obama Administration, testifying 
before the House Armed Services Committee in 2016: “Chinese military strategists began 
writing about the targeting of space assets as a ‘tempting and most irresistible choice’ in 
the late 1990s, and the People’s Liberation Army has been pursuing the necessary 
capabilities ever since.”15 Unlike the destructive measures employed by China during its 
anti-satellite attack demonstration in 2007, nations or individuals can assemble the 
technology required to jam satellites fairly easily. Given the asymmetric advantage that 
                                                 
13 Defense Department and Office of the Director of National Intelligence, National Security Space 
Strategy, 1–2. See also J. C. Liou, “Growth of Orbital Debris,” 4th ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) 
Workshop on Space Security, October 24–25, 2016, https://ntrs.nasa.gov/archive/nasa/casi.ntrs.nasa.gov/ 
20160012733.pdf. 
14 Pawlikowski et al., “Space:  Disruptive Challenges,” 32–33.   
15 H., Fiscal Year 2017 Budget Request, 5. 
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space provides to U.S. military forces and the ability of adversaries to target space assets 
for destruction or degradation, space has become a contested environment for the United 
States.   
Marking an increasingly competitive environment, the U.S. share of worldwide 
revenue from satellite manufacturing fell from 67 percent in 1997 to 41 percent in 2007.16 
The U.S. portion of global satellite industry revenues then stabilized at about 43 percent of 
the world total over the following seven years.17 Restrictive U.S. export control laws led 
foreign suppliers of space technology to market their products as “ITAR free” during this 
same period.18  Meanwhile, second- and third-tier suppliers in the United States found 
themselves severely challenged by U.S. market conditions.19 Recognizing the ongoing 
challenge to U.S. satellite manufacturers, the Trump administration’s current National 
Security Strategy lists simplifying and updating regulations to strengthen the 
competitiveness of U.S. firms on the global market as a priority action.20   
As the strategic environment has become more challenging, the U.S. Department 
of Defense acquisition system has begun to face challenges of its own in the development 
and procurement of space technologies. During the Cold War, satellites were strategic and 
highly classified.21 While important, the cost of U.S. satellites was given less weight than 
it is today. Individual satellites tended to be smaller and cost less, and they were expected 
to last only three to five years on orbit. This created a regular demand signal for the satellite 
technology industry and a healthy supply chain. 
                                                 
16 Defense Department and Office of the Director of National Intelligence, National Security Space 
Strategy, 3.   
17 The Tauri Group, “State of the Satellite Industry Report,” prepared for the Satellite Industry 
Association, September 2015, https://www.sia.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/Mktg15-SSIR-2015-
FINAL-Compressed.pdf. 
18 Joan Johnson-Freese, Space as a Strategic Asset (New York:  Columbia University Press, 2007), 
49. 
19 Defense Department and Office of the Director of National Intelligence, National Security Space 
Strategy, 3.   
20 Office of the President of the United States, National Security Strategy of the United States of 
America (December 2017), 31. 
21 Pawlikowski et al., “Space:  Disruptive Challenges,” 31–32.   
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In the 1990s, the growing competitiveness of foreign manufacturers of space 
technologies coincided with less spending on space technologies after the end of the Cold 
War.22 Already challenging market conditions were exacerbated by improved satellite 
reliability, reducing the demand for parts. Tough market conditions led to the consolidation 
of the U.S. satellite industry under prime, first-tier suppliers. Cost and delivery times began 
to swell as industrial competitiveness waned. Similarly, launch costs increased, and the 
launch base became less flexible. The United States began to field fewer but larger, more 
capable satellites. The end result has left the U.S. government with a more vulnerable set 
of constellations than it had in the more permissible space environment of the late years of 
the Cold War.      
The recent testimony and interviews of such leading governmental space authorities 
as Stephen Kitay, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy in the Trump 
administration, and Doug Loverro, his predecessor in the Obama administration, provide 
insight into the benefits and challenges of coalition operations in space today. In a 
December 2017 interview with Space News, Kitay postulated a current need to work with 
international partners to develop and rules of engagement and international norms of 
behavior for space.23 In testimony before Congress in 2014 and 2016, respectively, Loverro 
argued for the ability of coalition operations to provide for resilience, and thereby mission 
assurance, as well as to complicate the strategic calculus of potential adversaries in 
space.2425 One of the ways that coalition space operations complicates the strategic calculus 
of the of the U.S. military’s potential adversaries is by disaggregating space capabilities 
onto multiple systems.26 Attacking coalition space assets multiplies the diplomatic 
repercussions for the potential adversaries as well.      
                                                 
22 Pawlikowski et al., “Space:  Disruptive Challenges,” 31–34.   
23 Sandra Erwin, “DoD Space Policy Chief: ‘It’s imperative that we innovate,’” Space News, 
December 4, 2017, http://spacenews.com/dod-space-policy-chief-its-imperative-that-we-innovate/. 
24 Fiscal Year 2015 and Future Years Defense Program, Committee on Armed Service, Subcommittee 
on Strategic Forces, 13th Cong., 2nd sess., (March 12, 2014) (statement of Doug Loverro, Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy, Department of Defense),  6–7. 
25 H., Fiscal Year 2017 Budget Request, 9. 
26 Air Force Space Command, “Resiliency and Disaggregated Space Architectures,” August 21, 2013, 
1, http://www.afspc.af.mil/Portals/3/documents/AFD-130821-034.pdf?ver=2016-04-14-154819-347. 
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In summary, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and the Department 
of Defense developed the 2011 National Security Space Strategy because Congress had 
recognized that the use of space had become an increasingly vital and challenged element 
of national power. The National Security Space Strategy characterized space as a 
“congested, contested, and competitive” environment at the time of its release. 
Furthermore, it prescribed increased partnering with allies as a strategy to protect the 
security of the United States in this challenging space environment. This thesis addresses 
the research question, “How might the United States benefit from coalition operations in 
space?” so that the United States may implement its National Security Space Strategy more 
fully and one day operate as a coalition force in space.       
B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Surveying literature written on the subject of space security since 2001, there are 
two discernable points of inflection. The idea of space control was ascendant in the United 
States until 2007–2008. International criticism on moral and practical grounds saw 
literature on space control overcome by literature advocating for more collective 
approaches to space security, such as the space deterrence strategy set forth by the Obama 
administration, at that time. Space deterrence then began to face its own political challenges 
in 2013, leading to increased criticism of the Obama administration’s deterrence strategy 
starting in 2015–2016. Authors have tended to criticize the U.S. deterrence strategy for 
space on methodological grounds rather than moral grounds since then.    
Everett Dolman’s book Astropolitik received a number of positive reviews 
following its publication in 2001.27 Dolman espoused the idea that a major power would 
inevitably establish military control of space in order to set the laws and conditions for the 
exploitation of space resources. He argued that this would be the United States, by dent of 
its moral legitimacy as a great liberal democratic power. This space hegemon would then 
use the bounty gained from its early exploitation of space to maintain its supremacy and 
                                                 
27 See John B. Sheldon, “Astropolitik: Classical Geopolitics in the Space Age,” Comparative Strategy, 
vol. 21, no. 3 (2002), 235–237 and Peter Hays, “The Military Use of Space: A diagnostic Assessment / On 
the Edge of …,” Air and Space Power Journal, vol. 16, no. 3 (Fall 2002), 103–104 for positive receptions 
of the book.   
 9 
benevolently rule the rest of the world in space.28 Corollaries to Dolman’s work could be 
found in the writing of John J. Klein, as well as in the preoccupation with space-power 
theory evidenced by, among others, Peter Hays.29  
Fraser MacDonald’s 2007 article “Anti-Astropolitik – outer space and the orbit of 
geography” is fairly representative of the international community’s response to 
Astropolitik. Among his other criticisms, MacDonald wrote that Dolman’s “sunny view 
that the United States is ‘willing to extend legal and political equality to all’ sits awkwardly 
with the current suspension of the rule of law in Guantanamo Bay as well as in various 
other ‘spaces of exception.’”30 Joan Johnson-Freese criticized Dolman’s work indirectly in 
Space as a Strategic Asset in her critique of the Bush-era space policy of the United States. 
She took issue with the Bush administration’s efforts to control the spread of space 
technology that it was, in fact, unable to control and with its policies that tended to advocate 
for the weaponization of outer space, at least by the United States.31  
Along with others, James Clay Moltz found himself at an inflection point in the 
space policy debate in 2008 when he wrote: “A key question that will affect space security 
is whether states will fall back on self-absorbed nationalist approaches—as has so 
frequently occurred in the past—or whether they will be willing to accept the inevitable 
transaction costs of collective security approaches. One possibility is that, coalitions or 
even alliances might form in space.”32 The Obama administration helped usher in a 
collective security approach with its National Security Strategy in 2010 and its National 
Security Space Strategy in 2011. Closer security relations with friends and allies was but 
                                                 
28 Everett C. Dolman, Astropolitik:  Classical Geopolitics in the Space Age (London:  Frank Cass, 
2002), 181. 
29 See John J. Klein, Space Warfare:  Strategy, Principles, and Policy (New York:  Routledge, 2006) 
and Charles D. Lutes and Peter Hays, Toward a Theory of Spacepower:  Selected Essays, (Washington, 
DC:  National Defense University, 2011). 
30 Fraser MacDonald, “Anti-Astropolitik – Outer Space and the Orbit of Geography,” Progress in 
Human Geography, vol. 31, no. 5, 2007, 608.  
31 Johnson-Freese, Space as a Strategic Asset. 
32 James Clay Moltz, “Next Steps towards Space Security,” in Space Security, ed. Sukhvinder Kaur 
Multani (India: The Ifcai University Press, 2008).    
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one part of the United States space strategy, aimed primarily at deterrence rather than at 
space control.   
In 2011, Moltz again wrote about the potential for coalition operations in space, 
this time discussing their ability to usher in international norms and provide resilience for 
the United States and its closest friends and allies.33 Dovetailing off of Moltz’s work, Al 
Scott built upon the idea that lack of familiarity with allied and friendly space capabilities 
has prevented closer collaboration between militaries in the areas of Space Situational 
Awareness and Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance.34 This literature saw 
international progress as elusive, in 2011 even, and presented greater knowledge of foreign 
capabilities in defense-related space activities as part of the solution.          
In a 2016 work, Paul Meyer calls for de-escalatory commentary on space 
developments as well as some well-publicized commentary on exercises in transparency in 
the wake of several failed efforts to create international legislature on space activities in 
2013.35 In 2016, Theresa Hitchens and Joan Johnson-Freese also cite 2013 as the year that 
the United States moved away from a policy of strategic restraint, following suspicious 
Chinese tests near the altitude required to maintain geostationary orbit.36 Hitchens and 
Johnson-Freese call for a greater emphasis on “positive deterrence” in the next United 
States National Security Space Strategy, explaining that “positive deterrence includes 
taking into account the interests of potential adversaries and seeking to mitigate threat 
perceptions of one’s own actions and intentions.”37  
                                                 
33 James Clay Moltz, “Coalitions in Space:  Where Networks Are Power,” Space and Defense, vol. 5, 
no. 1 (Summer 2011), 5–22.     
34 Alan D. Scott, “Coalition Building in Space:  Initial Technical Considerations and Potential 
Implementation Strategies.” [Prepared as a supplement to the Defense Threat Reduction Agency’s project 
on “Allied Security and an Integrated Satellite Network”] (August 2011), 1.    
35 Paul Meyer, “Dark Forces Awaken: the Prospects for Cooperative Space Security,” The 
Nonproliferation Review, vol. 23, nos. 3–4 (June-July 2016), 495–503, DOI: 10.1080/10736700.2016. 
1268750. 
36 Theresa Hitchens and Joan Johnson-Freese, “Toward a New National Security Strategy: Time for 
Strategic Rebalancing,” Atlantic Council Strategy Paper No. 5, Atlantic Council (June 2016), iii. 
37 Hitchens and Johnson-Freese, “Toward a New,” Atlantic Council, 27–28. 
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Interestingly, while Hitchens and Johnson-Freese critique the U.S. strategy of 
deterrence generally and mention the expressed desire of Obama administration to increase 
allied cooperation specifically, their discussion of the subject of allied cooperation is 
largely divorced from the larger argument for positive deterrence. The same can be said 
for a critique that Christopher Stone makes of the National Security Space Strategy, in 
2015, in which he explains that the U.S. deterrence strategy lacks a contextual 
understanding of the historical and cultural realities of the post-Cold War security 
environment.38 Thus, these two authors criticized the method in which the United States 
went about its deterrence strategy up through 2016 without engaging critically how the 
United States pursued allied cooperation in space.    
C. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
As presented in the opening paragraph of this thesis, the United States has made 
modest progress in the creation of space coalition in the last several years. If progress is to 
continue in building a space coalition, however, and especially if it is going to expand to 
new partners, such as France and Japan, the United States must critically consider the 
barriers to such coalition operations and how to overcome them. Similar to efforts at getting 
the intelligence community and the Department of Defense to collaborate on a National 
Security Space Strategy in the 2000s, efforts at creating a coalition space network have 
“cultural differences” to overcome. Specifically, experts have commonly cited a lack of 
firm political leadership, realistic milestones, adequate technological capabilities, and trust 
in handling sensitive information as barriers to meaningful coalition operations in space.39 
 The answers to two questions will likely inform the operations of any successful 
space coalition including France, Australia, or Japan and the United States. First, how does 
military space in each country work?  Second, how might the militaries of each country 
work together as a space coalition force?  The current discussion in the United States on 
coalition building in space has given inadequate attention to these two methodological 
                                                 
38 Christopher Stone, “Security through Vulnerability? The False Deterrence of the National Security 
Space Strategy,” The Space Review, April 13, 2015, http://www.thespacereview.com/article/2731/1. 
39 Jana Robinson, “Space Security through the Transatlantic Partnership,” Space Policy No. 28, 
February 1, 2012, 61–62. 
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questions, especially if we extend the relevant topics beyond technological capabilities to 
include information germane to political leadership, realistic milestones, and trust in 
handling sensitive space-related data. This lacuna may be filled, in part, by incorporating 
the arguments that well-respected foreign authors have made about the inner workings of 
space-related defense efforts in their own countries more fully than past literature has done.      
In 2010, for example, American and British authors Saadia M. Pekkanen and Paul 
Kallender-Umezu made a seemingly convincing argument about the increased and ongoing 
militarization of Japanese space programs. They argued that setbacks in the Japanese 
commercial space industry had led corporations to push their allies in the Japanese 
government toward military space projects, with attendant changes in the country’s formal 
laws, institutions, plans, and policies.40 In a review of the book, Japanese space policy 
advisor and professor at Hokkaido University Kazuto Suzuki wrote that “although their 
argument seems to coherently explain the history of Japanese space policy, it is not only 
unconvincing but also misleading for readers, who may not know enough about Japanese 
space policy.” Suzuki referred to his own extensive research on space policy, going back 
eight years, to support this argument in the review. Being Japanese does not make Suzuki 
inherently right about any aspect of space-defense in Japan, but an author with his 
credentials and experience in space policy ought to be included in a scholarly thesis about 
Japanese space programs.    
Frenchmen Francois Heisbourg and Xavier Pasco propose in Military Space:  
Europe between Sovereignty and Cooperation that their work is the first to treat in a 
systematic manner European cooperation in military space.41 As a unique example of 
international military collaboration in electro-optical satellites, the Helios satellites figure 
prominently in Heisbourg and Pasco’s presentation of lesson learned.42 The challenges 
                                                 
40 Saadia M. Pekkanen and Paul Kallender-Umezu, In Defense of Japan:  From the Market to the 
Military in Space Policy (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2010), 2. 
41 Francois Heisbourg and Xavier Pasco, Espace Militaire:  L’Europe entre souveraineté et 
cooperation (Paris:  Choiseul, 2011), 11. 
42 Alain Claverie, Jean-Piere Darnis, et al. “Towards disruptions in Earth observation? New Earth 
Observation systems and markets evolution: Possible scenarios and impacts.” Acta Astronautica No. 137 
(2017), 418. 
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faced by France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and others in the course of the Helios programs 
aligns with the corporate knowledge as to what makes collaboration in space difficult, 
especially for the military. Heisbourg and Pasco listed the desire to protect national 
industrial interests, fickle political leadership, and lack of trust in handling sensitive 
information as key problems needing to be overcome.43 This thesis could benefit from 
incorporating the direct, practical examples of European efforts at coalition space 
operations when considering how the United States might work in a similar capacity with 
France.      
Thus, this work seeks to answer, in a novel way, the thesis question, “How might 
the United States benefit from coalition operations in space?”  In its approach, it gives more 
emphasis to overcoming “cultural differences” than has existing literature on coalition 
operations in space. Furthermore, this work seeks to inform the larger methodological 
debate about collective approaches to space security, which is linked to the United States’ 
current space security strategy, focused on deterrence. It does this by expanding the scope 
of this methodological debate to consider how to further engage partner nations in coalition 
operations in space.          
D. RESEARCH DESIGN 
The research to support this thesis consists of comparative case studies of France, 
Australia, and Japan, delving into the politics of each country’s relations with the United 
States, a brief history of the country’s cooperation in space with the United States, and a 
qualitative assessment of the country’s military space capabilities. It pulls this information 
from a variety of written French and English language sources. 
E. THESIS OVERVIEW AND CHAPTER OUTLINE 
Following the introductory chapter, this thesis devotes one chapter each to France, 
Australia, and Japan. The final chapter consists of comparative analysis and policy 
recommendations. The chapters on each of the three countries have four parts, identified 
alphabetically: part A, a discussion of the military space politics of the country and its 
                                                 
43 Heisbourg and Pasco, Espace Militaire, 128–129. 
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disposition to collaborate with the United States; part B, a brief history of the space 
cooperation between the country and the United States; part C, a presentation of the 
military space capabilities that the country possesses; and part D, analysis and 




This chapter on French military space activities has four parts. The first part 
describes the strategic direction of France’s military space efforts and touches upon French 
predisposition to collaborate with the United States in this domain. The second part briefly 
describes the historical collaboration and mutual influence that the French and American 
space efforts have had on one another. The third part describes the organization and 
capabilities of France’s military space effort. The last part analyzes the preceding three 
parts to present the areas in which United States Department of Defense might benefit from 
closer military space collaboration with the French Defense Ministry.   
A. STRATEGIC DIRECTION AND PREDISPOSITION TO COLLABORATE 
Part A presents a series of developments that have affected French military space 
activities from the founding of the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance to the present. These 
developments include France’s nuclear program; its participation in the European 
Launcher Development Organization (ELDO) and the European Space Agency (ESA); 
French advances in SATCOM, remote sensing from space, and space launch; and the 
increased focus that the French government has placed on military space activities since 
2008. These developments warrant our attention since they are closely related to the 
barriers to security cooperation in space presented in chapter 1:  lack of firm political 
leadership, realistic milestones, adequate technological capabilities, and trust in handling 
sensitive information.  
France has been a formal ally of the United States since signing the North Atlantic 
Treaty in 1949. A key consideration at the time was how France and the United States 
should respond to the growing threat posed by the Soviet Union to North America and 
especially to Europe. The North Atlantic Treaty prescribed the development of a unified 
military command structure to deal with the Soviet threat and recognized that an attack of 
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one alliance member in Europe or North America would be responded to as an attack 
against them all.44  
The first successful explosion of an atomic bomb by France in 1960 would 
fundamentally shape France’s military space program and its security relationship with the 
United States for the next half century. In the 1960s and into the early 1970s, for example, 
France would invest funds into its nuclear efforts that could have gone into developing 
military satellite capabilities. For its part, the United States would take steps to prevent 
France from acquiring a missile delivery system for its nuclear weapons. When the French 
finally overcame American preventative measures to develop an independent launch 
capability, albeit by developing a rocket for a civilian space program, it would have 
profound effects on the commercial space launch market and the viability of ESA, starting 
in the 1970s.  
From 1958 until 1969, Charles de Gaulle would serve as the president of France.   
In addition to his desire for an independent nuclear capability, President de Gaulle’s dislike 
for supra-national organizations and the role that he envisioned for France in Europe would 
shape the country’s space activities during those formative years. In 1966, France withdrew 
from NATO’s command structure. Tellingly, perhaps, France would rejoin the NATO 
command in 2009, during the period in which its interests in space also began to re-align 
with the security interests of the United States. In addition to NATO, de Gaulle did not 
look very favorably upon the European Economic Community either. Thus, when France 
began to search for an economical way to develop a satellite launch capability, its political 
requirements would shape the approach it took.   
In the same year that it left NATO, France established a space port, the Guiana 
Space Center (Centre Spatial Guyanais) at Kourou (French Guiana).45 What it lacked until 
1979, however, was a satellite launch vehicle. In 1962, France was one of seven European 
                                                 
44 Australia Broadcasting Corporation, “Fact check: Does ANZUS Commit the U.S. to Come to 
Australia’s Aid?,” ABC News, July 22, 2014, http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-07-08/does-anzus-commit-
us-to-come-to-australias-aid-fact-check/5559288. 
45 Sébastien Matte la Faveur, “The Interest and Opposition of the French Military in Satellite 
Reconnaissance for France:  A Talk with a General Officer of the French Forces,” Space Chronicle, vol. 
59, sup. 1, 2006, 1–9. 
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countries to sign the Convention of the European Launcher Development Organization, 
created without sponsorship from the Organization for European Economic Cooperation, 
which would have permitted U.S. participation in ELDO.46 In the coming years, ELDO 
would flounder under political demands placed on it, in part, by France.   
In the 1970s, France was in a better position to participate in the creation of a new 
European space organization following de Gaulle’s resignation and replacement. In 1975, 
France participated in the establishment of ESA.47 French-led development of the Ariane 
rocket, first launched in 1979, proved crucial to ESA’s success.48 The commercial arm for 
the Ariane program, Arianespace, would capture about 50 percent of the commercial 
launch market by 1985.49      
Long focused on its independent strategic nuclear program and associated air- and 
sea-based delivery systems, France was able to devote more funds to its non-nuclear 
systems in the 1970s. The French government mandated the development of military 
reconnaissance and communications satellites for the first time in the 1977–1982 defense 
budget (Loi de Programmation Militaire [LPM]).50 This resulted in the Syracuse (Systeme 
de Radio Communications Utilisant un Satellite) communications satellite program, which 
began in 1980. The first dual-use Syracuse satellite, Télécom 1A, was launched on an 
Ariane rocket in 1984.51  For imagery, the defense ministry would agree to help fund 
France’s civil space program, CNES (Centre National d’Etudes Spatiales), to develop the 
first SPOT (Système Probatoire d’Observation de la Terre) satellite. The availability of  
SPOT satellite images on the commercial market would increase the commercial 
orientation of the U.S. military space reconnaissance program, as examined in part B. 
                                                 
46 Michael Sheehan, “Chapter 5:  European Integration and Space,” The International Politics of 
Space (New York:  Routledge 2007), 77–78. 
47 Sheehan, “European Integration and Space,” 82–83. 
48 Sheehan, “European Integration and Space,” 85. 
49 John Krige, Angelina Long Cahhahan, and Ashok Mahara, NASA in the World:  Fifty Years of 
International Collaboration in Space (New York:  Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 4. 
50 Matte la Faveur, “The Interest and the Opposition,” 3. 
51 Gunter Dirk Krebs, “Télécom 1A, 1B, 1C,” Gunter’s Space Page, http://space.skyrocket.de/ 
doc_sdat/telecom-1.htm (accessed March 11, 2018). 
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France then launched its first proper military reconnaissance satellite, Helios 1A, in 1995. 
It would embark upon the creation of a second generation of military reconnaissance and 
communications satellites in the 1990s and early 2000s.   
French products also began to provide an alternative to American commercial 
satellite technology starting in the late 1990s. Notably, when the export and use of U.S. 
manufactured space technology was restricted by aggressive U.S. International Trafficking 
in Arms Regulations (ITAR) from 1998 and until roughly 2013, the French aerospace firm 
Alcatel-Alenia spearheaded an effort to market and sell “ITAR-free” products.52 Several 
of the ways in which U.S. policy contributed to the development of the French ability to 
rival U.S. products in space is, once again, presented in part B.    
Following a falling out between France and the United States during the early 2000s 
over events leading up to the U.S. led invasion of Iraq, a rapprochement of French and 
American security-interests began to occur during the Sarkozy presidency (2007-2012). In 
2008, the Sarkozy administration addressed the subject of space security significantly in a 
white paper on security and defense (Défense et Sécurité nationale: le Livre blanc). Serving 
as a defense review, the white paper elevated space’s importance on the French national 
security agenda, much as the Space Commission’s report had done for military space in 
the United States in 2001. Several key points from the 2008 white paper pertaining to the 
French use of outer space were:  recognition that the employment of all nature of satellites 
—communication, observation, signals, warning, navigation, weather, etc.—had become 
indispensable to French military-strategic functions; opposition to a war in space; a 
proclivity to avoid weaponizing space; the need to align investments in space capabilities 
with strategic defense needs; and the placement of space doctrine, operations, and 
programs under a Joint Space Command (Commandement interarmées de l’espace [CIE]) 
commandant responsible directly to the French Armed Forces Chief of Staff.53 These 
                                                 
52 Amy Svitak, “U.S. Electronics Firm Fined $8 million for Export Violations:  As U.S. Loosens 
Satellite Export Rules, Suppliers Own Up to Violations,” Aviation Week, September 16, 2013, 
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53 Jean-Claude Mallet, Défense et Sécurité Nationale: le Livre Blanc, June 2008, 143, http://www. 
ladocumentation francaise.fr/var/storage/rapports-publics/084000341.pdf [translated by the author]. 
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policy changes would lead to more direct military collaboration in space, and a more stable 
foundation on which such collaboration could occur, as shown in the following paragraphs.  
Despite financial setbacks after 2008, France made concerted efforts to realize its 
vision of space security following the release of the white paper. A formal draft of the Code 
of Conduct for Outer Space Activities appeared before the European Union (EU) during 
the French presidency of that institution.54 The draft code later made its way into official 
consultations among members of the United Nations (UN) in 2013 and 2014. The United 
States supported the draft code by the 2013 consultations, only for the European-led 
initiative to die over procedural issues raised by Russia and China two years later.55  
Similarly, the French military established the billet of the CIE commandant in 2010. 
In 2016, the CIE commandant reported to the French National Assembly on his command 
and on France’s ongoing military space efforts for the first time. His testimony was 
followed by testimony of the current commandant in December 2017. The most recent 
testimony was particularly well attended by members of the National Assembly, reflecting 
the current level of French interest in national-security space issues.56  
The CIE has seemingly helped the French military to realize its military space 
agenda by giving a more pragmatic focus to France’s military space program. This 
naturally benefits the United States, addressing the need to develop realistic milestones. 
Prior to the creation of the CIE, France’s military space community was working to meet 
many different operator and user requirements with its available assets.57 Since its creation, 
the CIE has helped to set a unified agenda by overseeing the work of four offices 
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responsible for military space functions at the operational level and the work of military 
officers employed at the technical level. The CIE is charged with identifying the needs of 
the French Army, Navy, and Air Force, managing the use of space assets to coordinate 
their employment in meeting those needs, and participating in the planning and realization 
of space efforts with international partners. Consequently, it has become the entry point in 
France for all questions related to the military space competencies.   
Despite an announcement in 2008 that France would double its spending on 
military space applications to 800 million euros annually, the reality of France’s financial 
situation following the 2008 financial crisis has prevented it from fully realizing that goal 
through 2017.58 Thus, France devoted only 335 million euros to its military space program 
in 2013, when the Hollande administration conducted a defense review oriented at 
maintaining the status quo of France’s defense in a period of fiscal austerity.5960 This sum 
was increased to 596 million euros by 2015, however, probably linked to the French 
military’s requirement to replace eight satellites between 2018 and 2021.61    
At the direction of President Macron, the French defense minister presented the 
findings of its 2017 strategic defense review last October. The intent of this latest review 
was to frame the strategic security environment for France’s 2019–2025 LPM.62 This 
framing was meant to facilitate the French government’s efforts to prioritize its investments 
in defense, including in space defense, in the coming years. France’s military space 
activities fare well in this review.     
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In its findings, the defense ministry describes the space environment as being in a 
period of profound change.63 Changes to the space environment have been characterized 
by military and strategic competition as well as by a large increase in the number of state 
and private actors with easy access to space according to the review; this evolution and the 
unprecedented technological evolution that underpins it are pointing toward a new way of 
thinking about and exploiting space systems. The review notes that this new way of 
thinking and acting has brought with it an increased risk of confrontation in space, as 
countries may be tempted, now more than ever before, to deny their rivals access to space 
or to disrupt the operations of their space systems;  furthermore, countries now have the 
opportunity to openly fund anti-satellite technologies, such as advances in electric-
propulsion and robotics, under the guise of civil programs, since so many space 
technologies are dual-use now. The defense ministry notes, similarly, that it is concerned 
that countries may employ a variety of non-kinetic means to damage a rival’s space assets 
without running the risk of detection associated with a traditional kinetic attack.     
Faced with a growing number of threats to its space systems, the French military is 
still attempting to rise to the challenge on a still rather modest budget relative to France’s 
own civil space budget and relative to the U.S. military space budget, of course. Even with 
recent increases, France’s military space budget amounts to only one-fourth of the budget 
provided to CNES.64 By point of comparison, the U.S. military space budget reached parity 
with NASA’s budget around 1981 and now greatly exceeds it. NASA’s budget 
significantly exceeded the current French budget even in 1981.65  
Part of the French military’s response to its financial and technical challenges to 
date has been to seek increased international partnering. For example, it will use funding 
acquired from the European Union Space Surveillance and Tracking program to renovate 
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its GRAVES (Grand Réseau Adapté à la Veille Spatiale) satellite surveillance radar.66 The 
French military is also exploring opportunities for closer cooperative projects with its 
traditional strategic partners, particularly Germany, as well as closer cooperation with the 
U.S. Department of Defense in certain areas. In this regard, the current CIE commandant 
stated in his testimony before the National Assembly that the United States had provided 
the French military with access to its classified space catalog, normally available only to 
the Five-Eye countries.67 In addition to increased partnering, the French military is 
requesting funds to modernize its capabilities for monitoring objects in low-Earth-orbit, 
funds to upgrade the information systems it uses for space-security, and funds to sponsor 
studies related to monitoring the geostationary satellite belt in the next LPM.68 Fortunately, 
with France’s overall defense spending set to grow to two percent of the gross domestic 
product by 2025, the military space budget appears likely to increase as well.69  
B. HISTORICAL COLLABORATION 
Part B briefly describes how historical interaction between French and American 
military, civil, and commercial space entities has contributed to the development of France 
as a space power today, especially in the areas of space launch and Earth imagining. It also 
shows some of the second- and third- order effects of previous U.S. policies on technology 
sharing, international collaboration, and business that continue to resonate. This 
information is pertinent when the potential for wider collaboration is considered, extending 
beyond the narrow confines of jointly manning a satellite watch floor to broader decisions 
such as whether to adopt policies more or less favorable to an ally’s commercial space 
industry, for instance.   
The U.S. Space Act of 1958 mandated an organization to pursue both international 
collaboration and space leadership and brought the National Aeronautics and Space 
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Administration (NASA) into existence.70 NASA’s second director of the Office of 
International Programs, Arnold W. Frutkin, significantly influenced the institution’s 
approach to international collaboration during his tenure, lasting from 1959 to 1979.71 The 
criteria that he set for international collaboration meant that NASA would favor projects 
with countries that possessed significant wealth and industrial capacity. Upon coming to 
power in 1958, President de Gaulle was determined to strengthen France’s technological 
and industrial capacity, which logically contributed to NASA favoring projects with 
France.72  
Early in de Gaulle’s tenure, the French pursued improvements to the Veronique 
(Vernon Electronique) sounding rocket, three of which they launched from Algeria in 
March 1959.73 The Veronique rockets complemented the development of France’s nuclear 
force de frappe (strike force). Moreover, the sodium mixture that the Veronique delivered 
into the upper atmosphere helped scientists to improve their understanding of atmospheric 
winds and turbulences. Prior to the rocket’s first launch, a French scientist Jacques Blamont 
had brought a key piece of hardware used to expel this sodium mixture from the Veronique 
rockets home to France with him from the Air Force Cambridge Research Laboratories, 
located near Boston.74  
Success with the Veronique rockets reinforced French public interest in a national 
space program. The French national space agency CNES was born in 1961 with the 
attendant expenses that it incurred. That same year, NASA agreed to launch worthy French 
experiments and scientific payloads and to host French scientists in NASA centers.,7576 
This agreement stemmed from an initiative that the American delegate to the Committee 
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on Space Research (COSPAR) had proposed in 1959. The COSPAR initiative and the 
agreement made in 1961 led to the development of the FR-1 satellite, jointly sponsored by 
NASA and CNES.77 NASA used a Scout rocket to launch the FR-1 satellite into orbit in 
1965, making it the first French scientific satellite and the first satellite developed by 
CNES.7879  
Collaboration during the FR-1 project led to the development of commercial ties 
between high technology firms in France and the United States.80 As an example, the 
French firm Mécanique Aviation Traction and the American firm Thompson Ramo 
Wooldridge (TRW) developed an especially close relationship. As a result, Mécanique 
Aviation Traction gained access to TRW patents and know-how through a “Technical 
Assistance and Licensing Agreement,” while TRW bolstered its international image in an 
effort to win a contract with Communications Satellite Corporation (Comsat). This 
interaction logically contributed to the development of France’s nascent space industry.  
NASA launched Comsat’s Early Bird satellite to a geostationary orbit in 1965.81 
For its part, Comsat contracted TRW to build its third generation of International 
Telecommunications Satellites Organization (Intelsat) satellites.82 Comsat enabled speedy 
global coverage, effective competition, foreign participation, and nondiscriminatory 
system access, although its commercial orientation would pose certain challenges to 
governmental space collaboration in the coming years.      
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Unfortunately, Early Bird’s success served to unite French and German concerns 
over an American monopoly on satellite television and radio programming.83 In part, this 
was due to the cultural programming that television and radio programming implied. 
French and German concern with American influence resulted in the creation of a Franco-
German satellite telecommunications group in 1966. The group started the joint 
telecommunications satellite program Symphonie that same year. The Symphonie satellite 
program offered a political windfall for French and German politicians hoping for closer 
relations between the two countries. Moreover, the program was able to produce two flight-
ready Symphonie satellites in 1974 and 1975.   
As the first Symphonie satellite neared completion, the French and their German 
counterparts were challenged by how to launch it. Signed in 1964, National Security Action 
Memorandum 294 precluded American contribution or assistance to the development of a 
delivery system for France’s national strategic nuclear capability.84 Therefore, the United 
States would not have assisted France in the development of a heavy lift rocket to launch 
the satellite. Furthermore, in signing National Security Action Memorandum 338 the 
following year, President Johnson concurred with the recommendation of one of his 
advisors that the United States “should not consider requests for launch services or other 
assistance in the development of communications for commercial purposes” except as 
benefitted the single global commercial SATCOM network the U.S. government was 
trying to establish, i.e., the Comsat network.85 Lest the Nixon administration should change 
its policy, Comsat Chief Executive Officer Joseph Charyk continued to drive home his 
company’s opposition to the U.S. assisting other countries in launching their commercial 
communication satellites in communications with the State Department through at least 
1970.86       
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France’s participation in ELDO was intended to provide it with a capability to 
launch a communication satellite into a geostationary orbit. In 1966, ELDO committed to 
developing the Europa II rocket, which would have been capable of lifting a 200-kilogram 
satellite to geostationary orbit in the event of the rocket’s successful development and 
production.87 However, Great Britain’s announcement in 1968 that it would withdraw 
financial support to ELDO in 1971 would ultimately doom the launcher. France committed 
itself to producing the Ariane launcher in late 1972 as a result. Unfortunately, this left the 
Europeans without a European launcher for the Symphonie satellites. 
As a result of these developments, the directors of Franco-German satellite project 
had turned to NASA as early as 1968 to request Atlas or Thor Delta rockets to launch the 
Symphonie satellites.88 NASA agreed to their requests to furnish the rockets provided that 
an agreement could be reached on the experimental character of the Symphonie project. 
After negotiations lasting through 1974, NASA’s requirement that the satellites be 
experimental in character resulted in France and Germany having to renounce commercial 
exploitation of the Symphonie satellites for most of their design life. NASA thus agreed to 
launch the satellites. Nevertheless, the loss of revenue and the associated embarrassment 
caused by NASA’s reluctance to launch the Symphonie satellites fueled calls for an 
independent European launch capability, which the Ariane rocket later provided. In an 
effort to project this capacity, France very recently supported a proposal to launch all state-
owned European satellites on European launchers.89        
Turning to the subject of collaboration in Earth imaging, NASA stirred public 
interest in aerial photography from the earliest manned space flights. Project Mercury 
astronauts took photographs specifically for geological purposes in 1962 and 1963.90 The 
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Synoptic Terrain Photography Experiment during the Gemini program produced nearly 
1,100 geologically useful photographs in 1965 and 1966.   
NASA’s experiments at collecting and analyzing Earth imagery inspired the 
Director of the U.S. Geological Survey. He put forth the idea of collecting information 
about the planet’s natural resources from a remote-sensing satellite in 1965.91 Despite 
objections to the program raised by the Department of Defense, which was worried about 
the implications for its then-secret Keyhole satellite programs, the U.S. Secretary of the 
Interior announced the establishment of the Earth Resources Observation Satellite Program 
in 1966.92 NASA received approval to build the first satellite in 1970 as part of the Earth 
Resources Observation Satellite Program.93 In July 1972, NASA launched Earth Resources 
Technology Satellite, later named Landsat-1. 
NASA actively distributed Landsat data and taught people how to use it. Motivated 
in part by the Earth Resources Observation Satellite Program, as well as by military and 
commercial interests, France embarked upon the military satellite observation program 
(Satellite Militaire d’Observation Optique), which it later cancelled, and the civilian SPOT 
satellite program in 1977 and 1978, respectively.94  
In 1982, the French Ministry of Defense created an image interpretation center 
within its armament directorate to analyze Landsat images and to train military photo-
analysts in preparation for the SPOT satellites.   In 1986, CNES launched the first SPOT 
satellite. The French army established a reconnaissance section (Section d’Etude de 
Documentation et d’Images) to exploit SPOT images that same year.   
In 1990, the U.S. Army signed an agreement to receive SPOT images.95 Following 
operation Desert Storm, the U.S. Air Force also purchased the Eagle Vision system to 
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receive and process downlinked SPOT images.96 Thanks to the capability and commercial 
success of the SPOT satellites, France took the lead in the world market for satellite 
imagery in the 1990s.97 The U.S. military makes wide use of commercial Earth imaging 
satellites today.  
C. CURRENT MILITARY SPACE ORGANIZATION AND CAPABILITIES 
Part C describes the organization and capabilities of France’s military space 
program. This description starts with CIE’s organization. It then turns to France’s 
increasing military space capability and associated external service providers. Part C is 
directly relevant to topics such as the CSpO initiative, providing the who and what for 
current military-to-military collaboration with France in space.    
As discussed in part A, the billet for the CIE commandant was created in 2010. A 
member of the Joint Command in Paris, the CIE commandant reports to the operations 
chief on the Joint Chiefs of Staff while serving under the direct authority of the chairman 
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.9899 An Air Force brigadier general has filled the CIE 
commandant billet since its creation. As a point of comparison with the U.S. military 
hierarchy, the U.S. Air Force sent a brigadier general, the U.S. Strategic Command deputy 
director of global operations, to sign an advanced Space Situational Awareness (SSA) 
agreement with the CIE commandant in 2015.100 The Department of State sent the deputy 
assistant secretary for space policy.            
At the operational-level, the CIE subsumed four offices related to space defense 
under a single military commander upon its creation. The offices falling under the CIE 
currently are the Office of Space Policy and Cooperation (Bureau Politique Spatiale et 
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Coopérations), the Office of Future Planning (Bureau Préparation de l’Avenir), the Office 
of Coordination and Employment (Bureau Emploi et Coordination), and the Office of 
Exploitation of the Space Environment (Bureau Maîtrise de l’Environnement Spatial).101  
As the name suggests, the Office of Space Policy and Cooperation coordinates joint space 
policy and international and multilateral cooperation. The Office of Future Planning 
determines operational needs and leads the acquisitions of space systems. The Office of 
Coordination and Employment manages and directs the employment of military space 
assets. The Office of Exploitation of the Space Environment is charged with managing 
space situational awareness and space control, gathering intelligence of the international 
situation in space, and the development of space subject matter expertise in the French 
armed forces.   
The work of these four offices structures and organizes work at the technical space- 
operations level. Technical operations are organized into six competencies: observation, 
signals, space surveillance, missile warning, telecommunications, and position, navigation, 
and timing (PNT). Officers working at the technical level gather the military’s 
requirements and participate in the acquisition of products that optimize the utilization of 
existing space-assets. Currently, France’s military services do not have a dedicated cadre 
of space professionals; however, the CIE is in the process of determining the competencies 
and training required to put one in place.102       
As the French military’s subject-matter expert on space, the CIE advises the civil 
authorities and different bodies within the defense ministry. These bodies include the Air 
Defense and Air Operations Command (Commandement de la Défense Aérienne et des 
Opérations Aériennes), the Joint Directorate of Network Infrastructure and Defense 
Information Systems (Direction Interarmées des Réseaux d’Infrastructure et des Systèmes 
d’Information de la Défense), and the Military Intelligence Directorate (Direction du 
Renseignement Militaire).103       
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The CIE has at its disposition satellites covering the areas of Earth observation, 
signals intelligence, satellite communications, PNT systems, and space surveillance.104 
This section now turns to discussing the French military’s capabilities in the above mission 
areas, as well as briefly touching upon the environmental monitoring and space launch 
capabilities to which it also maintains access. It proceeds from discussing electro-optical 
capabilities to discussing those associated with signals intelligence, satellite 
communications, PNT systems, space situational awareness, and finally space launch.       
In 2016, the CIE acquired 45,883 satellite images, approximately 10 percent more 
than the year prior.105 This is an average of 125 images per day taken around the globe. 
The need for satellite imagery is growing, especially in view of France’s current level of 
military engagement.   
In the area of Earth observation, the military currently employs two Helios-II 
satellites, launched in 2004 and 2009, and two Pléiades satellites, launched in 2011 and 
2012. All of the satellites maintain sun-synchronous orbits. The Helios-II satellites provide 
imagery estimated at .35 m resolution from 700 km altitude. The Pléiades satellites provide 
.50 m resolution panchromatic imagery and 2 m resolution multi-spectral imagery from 
approximately the same altitude as the Helios-II satellites.106107 Pléiades is a dual-use, 
commercial and military, satellite that permits daytime visible and nighttime infrared 
imaging.108 Operating in pairs, the Pléiades satellites can be used for change detection 
analysis. The French military also has access to radar imagery thanks to exchange 
agreements with the Germans and the Italians. These agreements provides it with access to 
imagery from the SAR-Lupe (Synthetic Aperture Radar-Lupe) and COSMO-SkyMed 
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(Constellation of Small Satellites for the Mediterranean Basin Observation-SkyMed) radar 
satellites.109    
In 2016, the CIE commandant estimated that the French military would gain access 
to 650 images per day when all three of France’s new CSO (Composante Spatiale Optique) 
satellites were operational in 2021.110 The satellites will operate in polar orbits at 800 km 
or at 480 km altitude depending on the mission of the individual satellite. These images 
will be at a higher quality and across a greater number of spectral bands compared to the 
French military’s current satellite capabilities.111 The CSO satellites are expected to last for 
10 years, with the first CSO satellite being launched at the end of this year.112 CNES will 
oversee satellite maintenance and ground-station operations, presumably from its technical 
and operational complex in Toulouse, France.113114   
France has restructured the stillborn MUSIS (Multinational Space-based Imaging 
System) satellite program through its development of the CSO satellites.115 Whereas the 
use of the Helios-II satellites is scheduled among partner nations, and MUSIS was planned 
to pursue this type of scheduling, the French will control the scheduling of the CSO 
satellites once they are on-orbit. Germany and Sweden, France’s current partners in the 
CSO satellite program, will be granted access to a certain percentage of the satellites’ 
images based on their respective contributions to the program.   
In 2008, all five countries participating in the Helios-II program, led by France, 
agreed to provide Helios-II imagery to the EU Satellite Centre.116 Directed by a French 
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general since 2015, the Satellite Centre supports the EU’s Common Foreign and Security 
Policy and its Common Security and Defense Policy in particular.117118 In 2016, the 
Satellite Centre delivered 1,846 geospatial and imagery intelligence products to various 
EU civil and military entities and projects.119 The Satellite Centre sourced most of the 
images used in these products from commercial providers.120       
France has developed not only the satellites but also the means of exploiting the 
information gathered by its signals intelligence satellites in recent years.121 The four ELISA 
(Electronic Intelligence Satellite) satellites are part of a French experimental satellite 
program aimed at mastering the technology required for electronic intelligence collection. 
Like France’s other intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance satellites, the ELISA 
satellites are employed in a sun-synchronous orbit. This group of satellites will stay in 
service until the middle of 2020, with the CERES (Capacité de Renseignement 
Électromagnétique Spatiale) satellites replacing the ELISA satellites before the end of that 
year. The CERES satellites will be the French military’s first dedicated ELINT satellites. 
CNES will operate and track these satellites.122 
Of note, given its role in operating military satellites, CNES is a state-controlled 
entity of an industrial or commercial nature (Etablissement Public à Caractère Industriel et 
Commercial)123 CNES provides its expertise in the space domain to the French military 
through the Joint Chiefs of Staff, principally in coordination with the armament directorate, 
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and it receives a portion of its funding from the military.124125 CNES engages under private 
contract around 2,400 employees, mostly engineers. These employees are divided among 
centers in four locations: Evry (launch directorate), Korou (launch base), Paris 
(headquarters), and Toulouse (orbital systems). Around 70 percent of CNES employees are 
located at the Toulouse center.126    
The French military employs four geostationary telecommunications satellites: two 
Syracuse-3 (Systeme de Radio Communications Utilisant un Satellite-3), plus two total 
Sicral-2 (Sistema Italiana de Communicazione Riservente Allarmi-2) and Athena-Fidus 
(Access on Theatres and European Nations for Allied Forces - French Italian Dual Use 
Satellite) satellites, whose capacity is shared with Italy.127 One Syracuse satellite is located 
over West Africa; the other three satellites are located over the Middle East.128 The 
Syracuse-3 satellites are nuclear hardened and resistant to jamming, permit interoperability 
according to NATO standards, and allow for SHF and EHF communications.129130 Italy is 
the majority owner of the UHF/SHF Sicral-2 satellite; France is allocated frequency in the 
SHF range only on this satellite.131 The Sicral-2 satellite meets NATO compatibility 
standards like the first two Syracuse-3 satellites and the third, planned Syracuse-3 satellite, 
which it effectively replaced. With the Athena-Fidus satellite, France operates five of the 
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seven steerable beams, which provide the French military with additional capacity to 
communicate in the SHF and EHF frequency ranges.132  
The next generation of French communications satellites are the Syracuse-4 
satellites.133 These two satellites will help meet the French military’s current explosion in 
satellite communication requirements by providing renewed, additional capability in the 
SHF frequency range, in the X and Ka bands specifically.134 This explosion in information 
requirements is related to an increasing number of French combat systems relying on 
information exchange, such as jets communicating information between themselves and a 
command center. All French communication systems are in some way hardened, with the 
Syracuse-4 satellites designed to employ anti-jamming antennas and on-board processing, 
for example. The French military deployed 93 satellite communications ground stations in 
all the locations where French troops were present in 2016.135 
The French military currently uses both military and civilian signals from GPS, 
based on an agreement it reached with the U.S. government.136 As a result of this 
agreement, most French guided munitions use GPS; only a handful of special missions 
employing PNT did not use GPS in 2017.137 The military employs GPS receivers 
developed in France, as well as GPS receivers purchased from the United States through 
the U.S. Foreign Military Sales Program. The French will transition to using ESA’s Galiléo 
PNT system more fully over the coming years. The system will employ 30 satellites 
operating in a medium Earth orbit; its protected PNT services will become available in 
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2020.138139 Faced with an increased threat of jamming in the current operating environment, 
France plans to use PNT receivers with access to multiple satellite constellations, typically 
GPS and Galiléo. The United States has made a similar request to the European 
Commission to access the Galiléo PNT system.140 Through the so-called OMEGA 
program, the French military is also actively researching how to implement technical 
improvements to its receivers to make its high value platforms and munitions more resistant 
to jamming over the next two years.141   
In 2009, the French launched two Spirale (Système Préparatoire Infra-Rouge pour 
l’Alerte) experimental satellites to develop the technology necessary for an operational 
missile-warning satellite system.142 At the time, the French military planned to field an 
operational missile-warning satellite system in the 2019 timeframe.143 However, the 
timeline has been pushed back since 2009. This delay may be due in part to concerns that 
France’s European partners and the United States have expressed in the past about its plans 
to develop a missile-warning satellite system in addition to the aforementioned funding 
constraints.144145 The CIE commandant reported that the military would be studying the 
issue of advanced missile warning again with funds from the 2020–2024 LPM.146  
As discussed in the first section of this chapter, France is working to improve its 
SSA network, including its GRAVES tracking radar. The GRAVES radar is presently 
capable of tracking objects .1 m in size at distances of up to 200 km and objects 1 m in size 
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at 1,000 km.147148 The military wants to improve GRAVES’ capability from being able to 
track objects 1 m in size to tracking objects .5 m in size at the same distance by 2025. 
Improvements beyond .5 m resolution will require the development of another radar 
system, presumably one that does not use GRAVES’ bi-static design.149  
The Space Surveillance Division (Division Surveillance de l’Espace) of the Air 
Defense and Air Operations Command is responsible, overall, for tracking foreign 
reconnaissance satellites, notably for operational and strategic forces, and for GPS analysis 
related to the use of precision-guided munitions and search and rescue operations.150 The 
Space Surveillance Division carries out five functions in support of this mission:  
surveillance of low Earth orbit using the GRAVES radar; daily collection and analysis of 
satellite orbital data; precision satellite tracking using the SATAM (Système d’Acquisition 
et de Trajectographie des Avions et des Munitions) radars; surveillance of the geostationary 
arc using the nascent Oscegeane (Observation Spectrale et Caractérisation des Satellites 
Géostationnaires) telescope / spectroscopy application;  and monitoring of space weather 
using the FEDOME (Fedération des Données de Météorologie de l’Espace) network. 
Approximately 30 Space Surveillance Division personnel operate France’s space 
situational awareness network at a consolidated space tracking center located near Lyon-
Mont Verdun Air Base.151 The French military maintains access to additional SSA assets, 
such as TAROT (Télescope à Action Rapide pour les Objets Transitoires) and the Monge 
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tracking ships, which appear to be employed as supporting sensors to the Space 
Surveillance Division network.152     
Since the late 1980s, the French military has not needed to maintain independent 
satellites for terrestrial weather because the European Organisation for the Exploitation of 
Meteorological Satellites (EUMETSAT) and its international partners could provide it with 
weather updates.153 Although EUMETSAT has partnered with the Department of Defense 
in the past, it is ultimately an intergovernmental organization rather than a French 
organization.154155 It currently operates eight weather satellites in various orbits.156  
CNES launches French military satellites from the Guiana Space Center (Centre 
Spatial Guyanais). The Guiana Space Center is located at five degrees of latitude, making 
it an efficient location for launching satellites into a geostationary into orbit.157 The Guiana 
Space Center is co-operated by ESA and CNES.158   
French military satellites are currently launched on Ariane-5 rockets developed by 
the ESA.159 The Ariane-5 is capable of putting a 10-ton payload into a geosynchronous 
transfer orbit or a 19-ton payload into a low Earth orbit, at 500 km altitude. ESA will 
transition to using the Ariane-6 rocket to launch their satellites during years of 2020–
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2022.160 The Ariane-6 will be capable of putting a 10-ton payload into a geosynchronous 
transfer orbit or into lower orbits more affordably than the Ariane-5 rocket can.161 CNES 
also employs Soyuz rockets for medium lift and Véga rockets for small lift requirements.162  
D. ANALYSIS 
Part 4 analyzes the preceding three parts of this chapter to develop an understanding 
of how the U.S. Department of Defense might come to benefit from closer military space 
collaboration with the French Defense Ministry. This analysis is continued in chapter 5, 
when similarities and differences can be drawn among French, Australian, and Japanese 
space activities.   
Based on part A, the United States has benefitted from the French desire to promote 
responsible behavior in space since 2008. Beginning in 2008, France pushed for the Code 
of Conduct for Outer Space Activities, which the United States eventually rallied behind. 
Although the proposal fell apart under pressure, most notably, from China and Russia, 
France and the United States occupied a common diplomatic front for a time as they tried 
to advance this common cause. Along the same lines as the code of conduct, France and 
the United States have signed information-sharing agreements for SSA data in recent years. 
This has contributed to the United States and France developing common situational 
awareness about activities in space and building consensus. Gaining access to the French 
SSA sensors should permit the United States to calculate the ephemeris data of space 
objects more accurately.         
Based on part B, the United States military has benefited from the commercial 
orientation of French space activities. The U.S. Air Force and Army exploited imagery 
from French commercial satellites beginning in the early 1990s. The U.S. government 
currently shares commercial satellite imagery with its international partners thanks to the 
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security benefits and additional capacity that commercial imagery offers. The U.S. 
government would not have moved to commercial imagery exploitation as early as it did 
had the French not commercialized the SPOT images in the 1980s.   
Similarly, France’s decision to commercialize Ariane launchers could benefit the 
United States more than it has to date. However, the U.S. government launches its payloads 
exclusively on the rockets of U.S. launch providers, meaning that the free market is not 
truly at work driving down prices. The French government is also not benefiting financially 
from the current success of SpaceX. Instead, it is funding the development of the Ariane 6 
launcher and providing preferential treatment to Arianespace in the hope of making the 
Ariane launcher more viable. Upon reflection, the United States and France may find that 
they can pursue policies that protect their financial interests and the viability of their 
preferred launch providers for government payloads but allow for more flexibility in the 
selection of launch providers. Perhaps this could result in Arianespace launching a U.S. 
government payload to geosynchronous orbit out of the Guiana Space Center under the 
right conditions or in the French using SpaceX.         
Based on part C, the Department of Defense could benefit from several additional 
French space related capabilities in addition to the ones discussed above. France’s Earth 
imaging satellites do not produce a large number of images each day. Nevertheless, the 
resolution of the French satellite images is consistent with the resolution of the best 
commercially available imagery and useful for military purposes. By gaining greater access 
to French surveillance satellites, the U.S. military makes it more difficult for our 
adversaries to avoid being imaged. Bringing the French into the planned Combined Space 
Operations Center, which is discussed more in chapter 3, will aid with this type of tasking.    
French ELINT satellite capabilities would complement U.S. ELINT capabilities as 
well. There is not a well-developed commercial market for satellite ELINT.  Furthermore, 
French ELINT satellites are likely to collect on a wider range of frequencies than 
commercial automatic identification systems do, for instance.   
France’s military SATCOM is NATO compatible, which would facilitate U.S. 
forces communicating over French SATCOM and provide some redundancy to U.S. 
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systems. However, France appears to have a shortfall in military satellite bandwidth. 
Furthermore, French interest is centered over Europe, Africa, and Eurasia. These 
limitations could work to the advantage of the United States financially if France was to 
buy into a U.S. government owned worldwide constellation, such as Wideband Global 
SATCOM (WGS) as a result. 
The United States has belatedly recognized the benefit of European development 
of an independent PNT constellation, in Galileo. The existence of another constellation 
complicates adversary jamming by increasing the frequency range of the PNT satellites. 
Furthermore, a second PNT constellation provides redundancy in the event that GPS 
experiences system downtime.   
France is currently studying how to gain access to better missile-warning satellite 
information. The quality of the missile warning data that the U.S. provides to all NATO 
countries appears to be unsatisfactory for tactical operations.163 Therefore, the United 
States may find it beneficial to provide the French military with access to better missile 
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III. AUSTRALIA 
This chapter on Australian military space activities has four parts. The first part 
describes the strategic direction of Australia’s military space efforts and touches upon the 
significance of collaboration in space to the U.S.-Australian security alliance. The second 
part describes briefly the origins of Australia’s military space efforts and historical military 
space collaboration between the United States and Australia. The third part describes the 
organization and capabilities of Australia’s military space efforts. The last part analyzes 
the preceding three parts to present the areas in which the United States Department of 
Defense might benefit from closer military space collaboration with the Australian 
Department of Defence.   
A. STRATEGIC DIRECTION AND PREDISPOSITION TO COLLABORATE 
Part A presents a series of developments that have affected Australian military 
space activities from World War II to the present. These developments include the 
founding of the Woomera test range, the launch of Australia’s first satellite, the 
establishment of joint Australian-U.S. space research facilities on Australian soil, and 
recent efforts to ground the country’s civil and military space initiatives within a coherent 
and sustainable national framework.   
In 1951, Australia and the United States signaled a shared commitment to one 
another by signing the Security Treaty among Australia, New Zealand, and the United 
States (ANZUS). The ANZUS treaty helped to address U.S. government concern with the 
spread of communism in Asia and Australian government concern with a resurgent 
Japan.164 As part of the treaty, the United States and Australia resolved that when the 
“territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened 
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in the Pacific,” each party would “act to meet the common danger in accordance with its 
constitutional processes.”165  
The pledge of mutual support in the ANZUS Treaty was weaker than the pledge of 
mutual support in the North Atlantic Alliance Treaty. However, the bond between the 
United States and Australia has been stronger than that shared between the United States 
and most of its NATO allies. The secret agreements on signals intelligence shared by the 
United States and Australia have been a major reason for this strong bond. 
  In 1940, prior to the United States’ entry into World War II, the British and United 
States governments began to cooperate closely in the collection and sharing of signals 
intelligence.166 These two governments reaffirmed their desire for close cooperation in the 
collection and sharing of signals intelligence in the 1946 British-U.S. Communications 
Intelligence Agreement. In 1948, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand became party to the 
1946 British-U.S. Communications Intelligence Agreement pending formal assurance that 
they would abide by the terms of it.167   
In Asia’s Space Race, Clay Moltz writes that space activity in Australia has 
historically been linked to the United Kingdom’s early missile program and the United 
States’ civil, intelligence related, and military space activities.168 British involvement in 
the country stemmed from Australia’s status as a British Dominion and then as a 
Commonwealth State. From 1946 until 1980, the British and Australian governments 
collaborated in the Anglo-Australian Joint Project.169 This project led to the founding and 
development of the Long Range Weapons Establishment and the huge Woomera weapons 
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test range in central Australia in 1947.170 In 1955, the Long Range Weapons Establishment 
merged with several other defense facilities to form the Weapons Research Establishment 
(WRE), which would later collaborate with the U.S. Department of Defense on a number 
of projects.171  
The Woomera Range Complex provided the space needed for British and 
Australian testing of the Blue Streak missile in the late 1950s.172 The Australian and British 
governments would find the liquid-fueled Blue Streak missile unsuitable for its intended 
military purpose by 1960. To help justify its expenses on the failed missile program, the 
British government wanted to transition the missile program into a civilian-oriented rocket 
program. Great Britain’s promotion of the Blue Streak served as the foundation for a 
European satellite launcher program, contributing significantly to the founding of ELDO 
in 1961.173  
Australia benefited from Great Britain’s promotion of the Blue Streak to become 
the only non-European member of ELDO. Its membership was facilitated by the absence 
of a European spaceport prior to the development of the Guiana Space Center. Early 
variants of the Europa rockets were launched from the Woomera Range Complex. 
Moreover, military and civilian work on the Blue Streak program saw well over 1,000 local 
support staff assisting British and other European rocket engineers working at Woomera 
through 1967.174       
In 1967, a joint project among the United Kingdom, Australia, and the United States 
would launch Australia into the space age. Project SPARTA (Special Antimissile Research 
Tests, Australia) scientists and engineers used modified Redstone missiles that they 
launched from the Woomera Range Complex during 1966 and 1967 to observe how various 
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warheads reentered into the Earth’s atmosphere.175 After its first nine launches were 
successful, Project SPARTA was about to conclude with an unused modified Redstone 
rocket. The Australians seized the opportunity offered by the unused Redstone to develop 
and launch the Weapons Research Establishment Satellite.176 Launched in November 1967, 
the Weapons Research Establishment Satellite transmitted signals to Earth for five days 
and carried four scientific experiments on it.177 NASA would launch the Australian 
developed amateur radio satellite OSCAR-5 (Orbiting Satellite Carrying Amateur Radio-
5) in early 1970. Australia would repeat the feat of developing its own satellites again only 
in 2002, with Federation Satellite, and in 2017, with a university developed cube 
satellite.178 
In 1981, the Australian government and Australia’s major telecommunications 
provider Telecom formed Aussat.179 The purpose of Aussat was to provide 
communications across Australia via a domestic satellite network, for both military and 
commercial usage.180 Hughes Corporation built the first three Aussat satellites in the United 
States. The first two Aussat satellites were launched from U.S. space shuttles in 1985.   
In 1991, foreign investors, including the American-owned BellSouth Corporation 
agreed to purchase the debt-ridden Aussat company from its Australian owners.181 This led 
to the establishment of the Optus Corporation in 1992. Singapore Telecommunications 
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currently owns and operates the third and fourth generations of Optus satellites, which 
provide commercial and some military communication bandwidth to Australia.182     
Part of the reason for Australia’s lack of vision and independence until recently 
with regard to space has to do with the United States. An influential author of several works 
concerning U.S. intelligence and defense satellite facilities in Australia, Desmond Ball 
argued in 2001 that the signals intelligence agreements with the United States were the 
most important international agreements to which Australia was party.183 Another author, 
writing on Australian and U.S. military cooperation, punctuated the evolution of the 
ANZUS security treaty over its first 50 years with discussions of the three intelligence 
gathering and communications facilities established in Australia in the 1960s:  North West 
Cape, Pine Gap, and Nurrungar.184 Similarly, Brett Biddington, an influential author on 
Australian space policy, noted in 2008:    
The so-called Joint Defence facilities, notably Pine Gap, near Alice Springs, 
are regarded as jewels in the crown of Australia’s relationship with the 
United States. The U.S. alliance is the basis of Australia’s national strategy. 
In other words, there is an implicit space component at the heart of 
Australia’s national strategy and national security policy.185  
Desmond Ball explained the relationship between the Joint Defense space facilities 
and Australia’s security strategy writ large by noting that hosting these joint facilities 
provided Australia with preferential access to U.S. defense technology, cooperation and 
exchange agreements, and access to senior strategic councils.186    
Despite its close security relationship with the United States and to some degree 
because of it, Australia has struggled to define its own military space policy and program 
over the years. Brett Biddington explained one reason for this in 2008, when he asked 
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somewhat rhetorically at that point: “Why should a small nation in population and GDP 
terms5 assume technology and risks [of developing its own space systems] at potentially 
considerable cost, when, to this point at least, there has been no compelling reason to do 
so?”187 In seeming response, the Australian government has undertaken various efforts to 
respond this question and increase its military and civilian presence in space since that 
time.   
Since 2008, space has been the subject of many high-level reviews and policy 
statements made by the Australian government. The Australian Senate’s Standing 
Committee on Economics as well as the Department of Industry, Innovation and Science 
have contributed significantly to this increased policy focus. The Department of Defence 
has similarly elevated the importance of space security at the national level, as evidenced 
in the three defense white papers that it has produced over the last 10 years.   
In 2008, the Australian Senate’s Standing Committee on Economics authored a 
report entitled Lost in Space?  In submissions to the report, the Commonwealth Scientific 
and Industrial Research organization stated that it had already spent 100 million Australian 
dollars on the civil-oriented Square Kilometre Array radio telescope; while the Bureau of 
Meteorology indicated that it contributed 100 million Australian dollars annually for access 
to weather data.188 For its part, the Department of Defence stated that it would spend 927 
million Australian dollars for its contribution to the U.S. Wideband Global SATCOM 
constellation and that it had incurred long-term expenses of over a billion dollars on the 
space-related Jindalee over-the-horizon Radar. These sums represented a significant 
investment in space, with the money often going to foreign service providers in exchange 
for space data.   
Overall, the Lost in Space? report focused on the state of the country’s space 
science and industry sector and noted a number of false starts for programs that had been 
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aimed at creating a coherent and consolidated national space policy for Australia. These 
included the failure of the National Space Program (1986-2001), the failure of the 
Australian Space Office (1987-1995), and the failure of the Cooperative Research Centre 
for Satellite Systems (1998-2004), among other initiatives.189 Given the transience of the 
government’s previous efforts, the standing committee who authored the report 
recommended that the government make a gradual evolution toward a new national space 
agency.190 As part of this evolution, the report called for the establishment of a Space 
Industry Advisory Council comprised of representatives from industry, government 
agencies, the Department of Defence, and academics.   
In 2009, the Australian Department of Defence released its first white paper in nine 
years. Unsurprisingly, the review recognized that space systems had grown increasingly 
important to military operations in the intervening period.191 The report further recognized 
that attacks on critical space systems were a rising threat to Australia and the United 
States.192 The review announced plans to develop space specialists within the Department 
of Defence. The government also announced plans to purchase a remote sensing satellite 
in the review, which it said would add to Australia’s standing as a contributing partner to 
the U.S. space efforts.193 The planned satellite appears to have eventually manifested itself 
in Defence Project 799, announced eight years later, in June 2017.194  
By the middle of 2009, the Australian government had established the Space Policy 
Unit within the Department of Innovation, Industry, Science, and Research and mandated 
that the unit bring forward a national space industry policy.195 The government released its 
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Principles for a National Space Industry Policy in 2011. Nevertheless, the previously 
mandated National Space Industry Policy seemed to have mutated into the nominally less 
consequential State of Space report in the next several years.   
In 2013, the Department of Defence released a second white paper. The review’s 
introduction highlighted the lingering effects of the global financial crisis and the U.S. 
pivot toward Pacific as two changes to the strategic environment.196 The 2013 review 
placed greater emphasis on the U.S. Alliance than the 2009 review had. Two subsections 
in the report were devoted to space and communications cooperation with the United 
States. In the first of these subsections, the review mentions the relocation of a U.S. C-
Band radar to the Harold E. Holt Naval Communications Station at Exmouth, as well as 
planned discussions to relocate a U.S. space surveillance telescope to Australia.197 Pine 
Gap is the only joint facility mentioned in the subsection.198 Tellingly, each time that Pine 
Gap enters into the discussion of joint facilities in any of the three reviews, be it 2009, 
2013, or 2016, it is accompanied by a statement that the Australian government has “full 
knowledge and concurrence” of the activities that go on there. The review announced the 
government’s intention to continue to grow the number of space-trained personnel across 
the Defence Department in order to maximize its investments in space and cooperation 
with the United States.199   
From 2014 through 2016, the Department of Industry, Innovation and Science 
released the State of Space report annually.200  The report served as a compendium, 
summarizing the civilian space-related activities conducted by the Australian 
government’s major departments and other agencies.   
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In 2016, the Australian government released the results of its third defense white 
paper in the last 10 years. This was clearly the most ambitious review of the three, and in 
the words of the Defence Minister, it was “the first Defence White Paper to be fully costed, 
with external private sector assurance of the White Paper’s investment plans.”201 The 
government announced that it would fund the objectives set out in the review by increasing 
the defense budget to two percent of Australia’s GDP by 2020–2021.   
The 2016 white paper saw a rise in non-geographic threats in space as well as 
differences arising between China and the United States concerning the rules that governed 
conduct in space as two of the changes to the strategic environment.202 As a result of 
increased threats to allied space assets, the Department of Defence reaffirmed its 
commitment to strengthen Australia’s space surveillance and situational awareness through 
the relocation of the U.S. optical telescope to the Harold E. Holt Communications Facility, 
supported by planned upgrades to the facility.203 The Department of Defence planned, 
additionally, to increase its intelligence and targeting capacity through increased access to 
allied and commercial assets and, potentially, through increased investment in space-based 
sensors.204 It planned similarly to continue increasing the number of uniformed and civilian 
personnel working in space-related functions.205        
Finally, in 2017, in a move welcomed by government and industry officials, 
Australia’s Minister of Education announced the government’s plan to establish a national 
space agency.206 The government had created a working group, led by a former head of 
CSIRO, to advise it on the scope and structure of the agency at the time of the 
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announcement.207 The working group was initially supposed to provide its 
recommendations to the government by the end of March 2018. Although the 
recommendations were not forthcoming by the end of March, it is perhaps noteworthy, in 
pursuit of this effort, that Boeing and CSIRO had announced a long-term partnership aimed 
at exploring the potential for space infrastructure development and market related research 
and development in Australia by the end of January 2018.208 
B. HISTORICAL COLLABORATION 
Part B briefly describes the origins of Australia military space efforts and historical 
collaboration between the United States and Australia in space across military, civilian, 
and commercial entities. It shows the effects of previous U.S. policy decisions governing 
the U.S. presence in Australia and how the joint space research facilities and associated 
capabilities came to exist there. This information is relevant when considering the strength 
and limitations of military collaboration in space with Australia, shaping future policy 
decisions.   
While the Australian government’s capability to develop and launch a satellite 
improved from the late 1940s until the late 1960s, as presented in the previous section, 
Australia’s location in the opposite hemisphere of the globe to the United States and its 
remote and well-protected locations encouraged the development of U.S. government 
telemetry and tracking stations in Australia beginning in the mid-to-late 1950s. The U.S. 
government began making plans to build tracking stations for the Vanguard satellite 
program in 1955.209 Construction of the stations was led by the Army Corps of Engineers, 
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which incorporated stations at Woomera and Muchea into the network in October 1957.210 
The U.S. Air Force and Navy linked the Australian Minitrack stations to a control center 
in the United States via their teletype networks within a few months of the stations’ 
establishment.211   
The Minitrack network was turned over to NASA after NASA’s establishment in 
1958.212 In the 1960s, The WRE ran tracking sites at Carnarvon, Perth, and Woomera in 
support of NASA’s Manned Space Flight Network in the 1960s.213 NASA historian Sunny 
Tsaio explains of the Woomera site:  “Under agreement with the Australian government, 
the DOS supplied the land, power, facilities, and workers. In return, the United States 
furnished all the technical equipment, trained the WRE personnel, and installed the initial 
equipment.”214  NASA’s presence in Australia appears to have evolved over the years 
under a similar model. Since 1965, a station located in Tidbinbilla, near Canberra, has 
contributed to NASA’s Deep Space Network, and the Australian Government’s 
Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organization (CSIRO) currently 
operates one of NASA’s three-global Deep Space Network complexes in its entirety.215 
Ninety staff working in Tidbinbilla at the Canberra Deep Space Communications Complex 
support operations of the station’s four 34-meter antennas and one 70-meter antenna.216 
Along with NASA’s two other Deep Space Network complexes, located in California and 
Spain, the Australian complex permits NASA to maintain 24-hour communications with 
its operational spacecraft.217     
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The Department of Defense has also maintained a continuous presence in Australia 
since at least 1962. In that year, the U.S. Navy established a station in Australia to 
communicate with its Polaris ballistic missile submarines operating in the Western Pacific 
Ocean.218 Among the US-Australian joint facilities, U.S. operations at North West Cape 
were especially controversial given that, according to Desmond Ball, “Australia had no 
control over or even any right to be informed about the communications passing through 
the station, including possible commands to launch nuclear missiles.”219 Many Australians 
worried that the presence of this station on Australian soil increased the country’s exposure 
to the threat of a nuclear attack. U.S. Naval Communication Station North West Cape was 
renamed U.S. Naval Communications Station Harold E. Holt in 1968.220 Some 400 
Australians and 525 American personnel were employed at the station in the late 1960s.221 
The United States augmented Harry E. Holt communications station with satellite 
communications facilities in the 1970s and 1980s.222 In 1982, Polaris submarines were 
retired from the Pacific, although the communications station continued to support 
operations for U.S. attack submarines thereafter. In 1992, the station was turned over to the 
Royal Australian Navy, who appear to have essentially vacated it by 2002, at which time 
the majority of personnel assigned to the base were civilian contractors.223      
In 1965, American engineers reportedly began surveying Pine Gap valley, near 
Alice Springs, Australia, in order to establish a satellite ground facility there.224 In late 
1966, the Australian government announced that it had signed an agreement with the 
American Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency for the establishment of the Joint 
Defence Space Research Facility at Pine Gap. The facility became operational in 1970 and 
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has been responsible for communications with various defense and intelligence satellites 
over the years. By 1978, the facility employed over 450 people, roughly half of whom were 
Australian. However, at the time, the Top Secret section of the facility was thought to be 
manned almost entirely by Americans.225   
In 2001, Desmond Ball estimated that the number of people employed at the Pine 
Gap facility had nearly doubled to 875 over the previous year, in 2000.226 A rough parity 
in numbers was then maintained between Australian and American personnel. This 
increase in personnel since the 1970s was reportedly accompanied by an increase in direct 
Australian utilization of the facility, as personnel had begun to relay information back to 
their headquarters in Canberra and Sydney.   
The United States and Australia reached an agreement to establish the Defence 
Space Communication Station, also known as Nurrungar, in 1969.227 The erstwhile facility 
was located within the Woomera restricted area, whose natural advantages have been 
discussed. In part, financial considerations motivated the decision to build another ground 
station in Australia, in addition to Pine Gap, as it enabled the U.S. Air Force to employ a 
single satellite in geostationary orbit, as opposed to two satellites in Molniya orbits, to 
detect Soviet ICBM launches.228  
That the facility was a ground station for an early warning satellite program, later 
known as DSP, would not be announced until the 1980s.229230 Furthermore, Jeffrey 
Richelson states that: 
 [Australian prime minister] Gorton’s announcement that the United States 
would be establishing another major facility in Australia (in addition to the 
facilities at Pine Gap and Northwest Cape for intelligence and 
communications, respectively), along with the secrecy surrounding it, 
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would result in the new facility being subject to political controversy in 
Australia for the next three decades.231      
By the end of 1971, 519 personnel were assigned to Nurrangar. Over two-thirds of 
these individuals were American.232  
After the DSP proved its worth tactically by tracking tactical missiles launched 
during operation Desert Storm, Australian personnel at Nurrungar began working on the 
direct applications of the satellite constellation to Australia’s defense.233 This work 
included the Down Under Early-warning Experiment Exercise in 1997, which successfully 
combined DSP and the Jindalee over-the-horizon radar to detect anti-ship missiles 
launched off Australia’s northwest coast. In 1999, Nurrungar closed, and DSP operations 
were then reassigned to a smaller staff using more modern equipment at Pine Gap.234   
Australia became directly involved in the development of GPS in the 1980s, 
sending an Australian representative to the program office in 1982.235 Australia was a lead 
nation in the testing of the system thanks to its location in the southern hemisphere. After 
NATO, Australia was the first individual country to establish access to GPS’s Precise 
Positioning Signal.   
Moving into the 2000s, the Australian Department of Defence and the U.S. Navy 
agreed to establish a joint ground station in support of the U.S. Navy’s Mobile User 
Objective System satellite constellation in 2005.236 A Mobile User Objective System 
ground station was thereby established near Geraldton, West Australia. This made the 
Australian Defence Communications Station one of three joint facilities hosted by 
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Australia in 2007, along with the Joint Defence Facility Pine Gap and the Joint Geological 
and Geophysical Research Station, also located near Alice Springs.237  
During the Australia-United States Ministerial Consultations in 2010, the defense 
chiefs from the two countries signed an SSA partnership statement, reflecting significant 
current interest in this mission area.238 The statement laid the groundwork among the two 
defense departments for establishing additional sensors in Australia to track space objects 
moving over the Asia- Pacific region. The consultations also included discussions on 
establishing a civil space cooperation framework agreement. Presumably, these 
discussions will resume following Australia’s announcement in 2017 that it will establish 
a civil space program. 
In 2013, the Australia and U.S. defense departments entered into an advanced SSA 
agreement, which was the first of its kind for the United States.239  The agreement permitted 
Australia to make specific requests to the U.S. Strategic Command Joint Space Operations 
Center for information including maneuver planning, on-orbit anomaly resolution, and 
electromagnetic spectrum interference reporting and resolution. Given the similarities in 
the areas of cooperation, there is a discernable continuum from the basic SSA agreement 
that the Department of Defense signs, to the advanced SSA agreement, and on to the CSpO 
initiative and the proposed Combined Space Operations Center. 
C. CURRENT MILITARY SPACE ORGANIZATION AND CAPABILITIES 
Part C describes the organization and capabilities of Australia’s military space 
activities. This description starts by introducing Australia’s first dedicated military space 
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operations unit, Number 1 Remote Sensor Unit. It then turns to discussing Australia’s 
military space capabilities, some of which that unit operates.  
The Royal Australian Air Force created Number 1 Radar Surveillance Unit largely 
to operate the Jindalee radar network in 1992.240 In 2015, the Royal Australian Air Force 
renamed Number 1 Radar Surveillance Unit, making it Number 1 Remote Sensor Unit.241 
The name change reflected the importance that remote sensing had assumed for Australia’s 
defense and the increased emphasis Australia was placing on space situational awareness. 
The unit has since been headed by a Wing Commander in the Royal Australian Air Force. 
This is an O-5 position. In 2015, the unit had about 110 assigned personnel, many of whom 
were dual-trained on the use of both the Jindalee over-the-horizon radar and on space 
systems. Number 1 Remote Sensor Unit operates several systems within Australia’s Space 
Surveillance Network and the Australian Mission Processor, which directly downloads 
overhead persistent infrared information from the U.S. Air Force’s Space Based Infra-red 
System (SBIRS).,242243 
Number 1 Remote Sensor Unit is located on Royal Australian Air Force Base 
Edinburgh.244 Early in its existence, the base housed the headquarters for the Long Range 
Weapons Establishment. The base was used almost entirely for activities related to the 
testing of weapons at Woomera through the 1960s and supported a growing list of activities 
after that.245   
A successor to the Weapons Research Establishment, the Defense Science and 
Technology Group currently maintains an office adjacent to RAAF Edinburgh.246 Within 
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its development portfolio, the Defence Science and Technology Group’s National Security 
and Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Division maintains practically all of 
the systems that Number 1 Remote Sensor Unit operates.247 The National Security and 
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Division is involved in the Square Dance 
program, in which several space-related government organizations in United States also 
participate.   
This section now turns to discussing Australia’s capabilities related to the space-
based intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, communications, and space 
situational awareness mission areas.248 Australia maintains access to a sizeable number of 
defense-related foreign-operated space systems in these mission areas, reflecting hundreds 
of millions of dollars spent on space each year.   
In June 2017, the Australian government announced a 500 million Australian dollar 
investment in the country’s intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities as 
part of Project 799.249 Project 799 has two phases. In phase one, the Department of Defence 
has sought to gain more timely and direct access to data from commercial imaging 
satellites.250 This has resulted in a 14 million Australian dollar investment in ground 
stations to download the commercial imagery. In August 2017, the Australian government 
signed a four-year 104 million Australian dollar (83 million U.S. dollar) contract with 
DigitalGlobe, too, for access to its imagery library and direct access to its satellites.251 The 
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government announced that it would look into acquiring its own earth imaging satellite in 
phase two. Although the government has not made the formal decision to acquire its own 
earth imaging satellite, the Defence Science and Technology’s National Security and 
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Division’s Strategic Plan indicates that the 
Australian government will invest three to four billion Australian dollars on satellite 
imagery capability from 2023 through 2035, making this appear likely.252     
In 2013, the U.S. Air Force awarded Northrop Grumman a 12 million U.S. dollar 
contract to build Australian Mission Processor Phase 3, also known as Joint Project 2057 
Phase 3.253 The system processes data from SBIRS and DSP satellites in Australia’s area 
of interest. The processor is operated by Number 1 Remote Sensor Unit and managed by 
the Defence Space Coordinating Office at Air Force Headquarters.254   
For space-based signals intelligence, the Australian Signals Directorate has a team 
at the Joint Defence Space Research Facility at Pine Gap.255 The Australian Signals 
Directorate held the name of Defence Signals Directorate until 2013, when it was renamed 
to reflect a whole-of-government approach to signals collection and processing.256 
Australia employs a mix of dedicated military and commercial SATCOM systems. 
In 2007, the Australian government reached an agreement with the U.S. government to 
fund the sixth WGS satellite in exchange for gaining communications access to the entire 
WGS constellation through 2026.257 The WGS satellites provide Australia with 2.4 GHz of 
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secure global military communications in the X and Ka bands.258 A substantial amount of 
Australia’s total capacity on the WGS constellation is centered over the Indian and Pacific 
Oceans, with less bandwidth provided elsewhere around the globe.259    
WGS acquisition has been part of a larger Australian satellite communications 
project known as Joint Project 2008.260 Unfortunately, Joint Project 2008 has experienced 
schedule delays and cost overruns. This has been due to issues that Australian Defence 
Force contractor BAE Systems has experienced while building WGS ground stations in 
southeastern and southwestern Australia, at Harman and Geraldton. This delay has led to 
throughput constraints within Australia’s WGS ground stations, affecting military 
operations and exercises. The Australian Defence Force lacks sufficient WGS user 
terminals as well.  
In addition to WGS, the Australian Defence Force relies on capacity on Optus C1, 
a hosted ultra-high frequency payload on Intelsat-22, and commercial SATCOM from 
Inmarsat, ViaSat, and SpeedCast.261 The Australian government has requested Singtel to 
remove all commercial customers off of Optus C1 and to place the satellite into an inclined 
orbit in order to increase the satellite’s usefulness to the Australian military. Optus C1 is 
located at 156 degrees East longitude and operates in the Ku band.262  
In 2019, the Australian government will begin a new SATCOM program called 
Joint Project 9102. According to the head of Australian Defence Force’s Information and 
Technology Operations, that program will begin to take shape once the U.S. government 
conducts an analysis of alternatives for its own wideband and narrowband SATCOM.263 
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In 2014, defense officials from Australia, the United States, and Canada signed a 
Memorandum of Understanding to share data on satellite orbits, methods to mitigate 
satellite communication interference, GPS accuracy, and space weather data.264 This 
Memorandum of Understanding effectively established the CSpO initiative. New Zealand 
was later brought into the initiative. In March 2018, the Commander of U.S. Strategic 
Command, General John Hyten, announced that Germany and France would also be 
included in the CSpO initiative and that a Combined Space Operations Center would be 
formed by the end of 2018 to facilitate centralized planning and tasking among CSpO 
initiative partners and decentralized execution.265   
In 2015, the U.S. government relocated the C-band Space Surveillance Radar to 
Communications Station Harold E. Holt.266 The system attained full operational capability 
in March 2017. The radar provides the United States and Australia with early detection for 
launches in the southern and eastern hemispheres and improves orbital predictions and 
positional accuracy for on-orbit objects. The system tracks objects in low-Earth orbit 
specifically.267 The U.S. owned radar is operated by Number 1 Remote Sensing Unit 
personnel located at Royal Australian Air Force Base Edinburgh.268 Interestingly, the C-
band Space Surveillance Radar first entered operations in 1963 at a NASA space tracking 
station located in western Australia. It was then relocated to Florida and Antigua and now 
back to Australia.      
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In 2016, the U.S. Air Force took over ownership of the Space Surveillance 
Telescope from the Defence Advanced Research Project Agency.269 The U.S. and 
Australian governments agreed in 2013 to relocate the telescope from New Mexico to 
Australia. Presumably, the move will take place once the Australian government finishes 
construction on a 63 million Australian dollar facility being built at Communications 
Station Harold E. Holt to house the telescope.270 Communications Station Harold E. Holt 
was selected among potential locations in Australia to house the Space Surveillance 
Telescope due to its location with regard to objects in geostationary orbit and the 
monsoonal cloud band. Number 1 Remote Sensor Unit will operate the Space Surveillance 
Telescope.271    
D. ANALYSIS 
Part D analyzes the preceding three parts to present the areas in which the U.S. 
Department of Defense might benefit from closer military space collaboration with the 
Australian Department of Defence. Based on part A, the Joint Defence Space Research 
Facility at Pine Gap has helped to solidify the already mutual commitment of the U.S. and 
Australian defense establishments. Pine Gap’s remote, protected location and position in 
the southern and eastern hemispheres make it ideal for communication with a variety of 
national satellite payloads. The facility can communicate with satellites operating in 
geostationary orbits near the longitudinal position of the facility. Furthermore, satellites 
operating in Molniya orbits tend to make their closest approach to Earth over the southern 
hemisphere. This proximity would decrease the free space loss of signals transmitted to 
this facility and similar facilities located in Australia from satellites placed into highly 
elliptical orbits. Ground stations in somewhat less remote locations in Australia, such as 
Geraldton, offer similar benefits to the programs they support.   
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Based on part B, Australians have been integral to the operations of U.S. and joint 
space facilities located in the Australia since at least the 1960s. Nowhere is this more 
evident than at the Canberra Deep Space Communication Complex, entirely manned by 
Australians today, although the same can evidently be said for current and planned 
operations at Naval Communication Station Harold E Holt. The Joint Defence Space 
Research Facility at Pine Gap is also jointly manned. This likely results in a significant 
cost savings to the United States government in terms of training and personnel support.   
Since the 1990s, the Australian military has sought to integrate Defense Support 
Program data into its ground-based missile detection network. It is undertaking similar 
efforts with SBIRS. This integration benefits the United States by making the Australian 
military more lethal. For instance, better sensor to shooter integration facilitates Australian 
military efforts to target a missile or a ship firing a missile toward the space research facility 
at Pine Gap. 
Australia’s location in the southern hemisphere was a boon to GPS testing. 
Curiously, the U.S. Air Force also has a contingent of personnel at the Joint Geological 
and Geophysical Research Station.272 This would to point toward the continued relevance 
of Australia’s geographic location to ongoing research into the effects of the Earth’s 
magnetic field on air and space systems.   
Based on part C, Australia’s investment provided the United States with the funds 
to purchase an additional WGS satellite. In addition to increasing the capacity of the 
constellation, an additional satellite improves the resiliency of the entire constellation, too, 
since the WGS satellites can be repositioned to improve system coverage in the event that 
one or more satellites are inoperable. As noted, Australia is waiting on the United States to 
conduct an analysis of alternatives for its wideband and narrowband SATCOM, the results 
of which will inform future Australian investments.   
Given that Australia and the United States share the WGS constellation, it follows 
that the two countries would also want to share information on communication interference 
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and space weather, as they do under the CSpO initiative. If the Australian government had 
its own government-operated satellite, such as the one being discussed under Project 799, 
that would clearly benefit the operations envisioned at the Combined Space Operations 
Center, by giving the center an Australian satellite to task.     
The once controversial Naval Communication Station Harold E Holt has found a 
new, relatively benign life as a node of the United States Space Surveillance Network 
thanks to recent agreements with the Australian government, which will operate the node. 
The repurposing of NASA’s C-band radar as a military radar operated by the Australian 
Air Force indicates the opportunity for collaboration between non-traditional partners, such 
as NASA and the Australian Department of Defence or CSIRO and the U.S. Department 
of Defense, when their interests align.     
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Chapter four follows the same format as the previous two chapters, consisting of 
four parts.  Part one presents the security relationship between the Japan and the United 
States, which has matured slowly, particularly with respect to collaboration in space.  Part 
two discusses the modest collaboration between the civil and military space organizations 
in the United States and Japan.  Part three, on capabilities, highlights Japan’s rapidly 
growing space capabilities, following the release of Japan’s first-ever National Security 
Strategy in 2013.  Part four analyzes possible avenues for increased collaboration among 
defense-related space entities in Japan and the United States.   
A. STRATEGIC DIRECTION AND PREDISPOSITION TO COLLABORATE 
 As briefly introduced in chapter one, scholars have devoted considerable 
effort to explaining why Japan’s Diet has begun to pass more military-oriented space 
policies in the past two decades, most especially the Basic Space Law, passed in 2008.  
There has not been a definitive resolution to these scholarly debates.  Part one tends to 
focus on the high points of the changes in space policies rather than delving deep into these 
debates.  Furthermore, Japan and the United States have agreed in principle, since 1951, 
that Japan would gradually assume greater responsibility for its own defense, and as U.S., 
French, and Australian strategic reviews have noted since 2001, space capabilities have 
become critical to most countries’ modern defense efforts.  The same argument can be 
made, and indeed has been made, for Japan.273   
Nearly simultaneous to the United States’ entry into the ANZUS treaty, the United 
States and Japan entered into the Security Treaty Between the United States and Japan and 
the San Francisco Peace Treaty in September 1951.  The security treaty included provisions 
that would limit Japan’s re-militarization in the coming years and affect, at least indirectly, 
Japan’s military space activities.  As a result of the security treaty, the United States was 
required to protect Japan militarily, until such time as Japan could “assume responsibility 
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for its own defense against direct and indirect aggression, [while] always avoiding any 
armament which could be an offensive threat or serve other than to promote peace and 
security.” 274  
The Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States of 
America and Japan replaced the Security Treaty between the United States and Japan in 
1960.  Similar to the ANZUS treaty in the type of response that it required to military 
aggression but more limited geographically, the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation stated that 
“each Party recognizes that an armed attack against either Party in the territories under the 
administration of Japan would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that 
it would act to the common danger in accordance with its constitutional provisions and 
processes.”275 What these constitutional provisions mean to the actual practice of collective 
self-defense is discussed more in part D. 
Among its other results, the Treaty of San Francisco ended the immediate postwar 
prohibitions on rocket research in Japan in 1951.276 In the mid-1950s, a researcher at Tokyo 
University named Hideo Itakawa was thus able to begin Japanese research on small solid-
fueled rockets for use in launching scientific experiments.  Itakawa and his group of 
researchers formed the nucleus of Japan’s Institute of Space and Aeronautical Science, 
established in 1964.  An internationally oriented group of researchers led by Kankuro 
Kaneshige headed Japanese research on liquid-fueled rockets for use in launching 
industrially-oriented applications satellites in the 1960s.  Kaneshige chaired the National 
Space Activities Council, which later merged with a division of the Ministry of Posts and 
Telecommunications to form Japan’s National Aeronautics and Space Development 
Agency (NASDA) in 1969.  Although the existence of multiple, non-aligned groups of 
space researchers in Japan hindered efforts at international collaboration, NASA 
encouraged Japanese development of liquid-fueled rockets, agreeing to provide Japan with 
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Thor-Delta rocket technology in 1969.  This assistance contradicted National Security 
Action Memorandum 334, introduced in chapter two, but the U.S. government deemed it 
acceptable due to the perception that Japan needed to provide a symbolic response to 
Chinese advances in nuclear technology.  Japan used an indigenously developed solid-fuel 
rocket to launch its first orbital satellite from Kagoshima Space Center in early 1970.277 
Japan began launching satellites using a variant of the liquid-fueled Thor-Delta rocket in 
1975. 
In 1969, Japan’s lower house of Parliament passed a resolution stating that Japan 
could use space only for peaceful, non-military purposes.278 This law represented a 
fundamentally different interpretation of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty than that reached by 
most of the treaty’s other signatories, including the United States.  This interpretation of 
the Outer Space Treaty meant that the use of communication and earth-imaging satellites 
for military purposes was subject to parsimonious debate and scrutiny in Japan until the 
Diet passed the Basic Space Law in 2008.  By interpreting peaceful to mean defensive 
rather than non-military, the new Basic Space Law permitted the Japan Self-Defense 
Forces (JSDF) to use satellites militarily with fewer obstacles than ever before. 
Collaboration in civil-space endeavors between Japan and the United States grew 
in the 1970s.279 NASA agreed to host Japanese scientific experiments in the Space Lab, 
which U.S. space shuttles housed occasionally on flights.  Likewise, Japan agreed to fund 
the construction of a ground station for Landsat.  By the early 1980s, Japan was partnering 
extensively with NASA on science and technology projects, including in the early planning 
and development of the Space Station, for which it later built the Japanese Experimental 
Module. 
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Despite the peaceful purposes resolution then in effect, the Japanese began to ease 
restrictions regarding the JSDF’s use of telecommunications satellites in the 1980s.280 In 
1985, the JSDF purchased terminals to communicate over the U.S. Navy’s Fleet Satellite 
Communications system.281 Japan Defense Agency also began to acquire commercial 
imagery from the SPOT and Landsat satellites in the mid-1980s.282 The Japanese 
government started to support research into remote-sensing technologies at the same time.  
This resulted in NASDA developing two Marine Observation Satellites.283 NASDA 
launched the two satellites on Japanese variants of the American Thor and Delta rockets in 
1987 and 1990. The Japanese military went on to employ the Marine Observation Satellites 
to image Chinese construction on disputed territories in the South China Sea in 1993, 
marking an early example of the Japanese utilizing indigenously developed satellites for 
military reconnaissance.284   
The Japan Defense Agency, and other government organizations began to study the 
possibility of building and launching dedicated reconnaissance satellites in the early 1990s, 
after the United States brought “Operation Desert Storm” to a successful conclusion.285 
North Korea’s launch of missiles into the Sea of Japan in 1993 and over Japanese territory 
in 1998 provided further impetus for a reconnaissance satellite program.  In 2003, Japan 
launched its first electro-optical and radar reconnaissance satellites, known as the 
Information Gathering Satellites (IGS).286  As enumerated in part three, additional IGS 
launches would follow over the coming years. 
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In the early 2000s, the Japanese government consolidated its civil space agencies 
into the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology in 2001, creating 
the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) in 2003.287 This consolidation 
effectively placed the majority of Japan’s space budget under the supervision of an 
education bureaucrat.288 A prominent American critic on Japanese space policy, Paul 
Kallender, estimated nearly a decade later that the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, 
Science and Technology controlled 60 percent of the Japanese government’s 3.75 billion 
U.S. dollar annual space budget through its contributions to JAXA.289  
Among its other provisions, the 2008 Basic Space Law (mentioned earlier) also 
contributed to this consolidation of Japanese space activities.  It established the Strategic 
Headquarters for Space Policy, which helped to unify the disparate space interests 
represented by Cabinet members in several different ministries until that time.  In 2012, 
the Diet passed an additional law to refine the organization of space activities within the 
Prime Minister’s Cabinet Office and established the Office for National Space Policy to 
inform the decisions of the Strategic Headquarters for Space Policy.290  
Following passage of the Basic Space Law in 2008, Japan promulgated its first ever 
Basic Plan on Space Policy in 2009.  This was followed by new plans in 2013, 2015, and 
2016.  The 2015 plan was notable in that it aligned investment decisions for space 
technology with Japan’s first ever National Security Strategy, released in 2013.291 The 
2013 National Security Strategy recognized that Japan needed to make more effective use 
of satellites “for the operation of the [sic] SDF units, information-gathering and analysis, 
maritime domain awareness, telecommunications, positioning, navigation, and timing,” 
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and that it would improve its SSA system.292 Additionally, the 2015 plan recognized that 
the United States had modified its approach to space policy, as it had moved from a policy 
meant to ensure independence and space dominance to one focused on international 
partnerships and resiliency.293 The plan noted that the United States had demonstrated this 
change in focus during a ministerial conference the previous year, in which the United 
States and Japan had discussed their complementary and mutual interests in PNT systems, 
space-enabled missile defense, and satellite imagery.  The 2015 Basic Plan for Space Policy 
stated that the Japanese government would take steps to reinforce cooperation with the 
United States in these mission areas. 
Paul Kallender summarized Japan’s Basic Plan for Space Policy in 2016.  He 
characterized it as “the first really implementable policy,”294 which was “designed to 
support a more proactive US-Japan alliance role in containing China, and robustly defend 
Japan against North Korean ballistic missile threats.”295 Unlike the previous plans, the 
fourth Basic Plan on Space Policy was fully funded.296 Kallender explained that the 
allocation of resources in the Basic Plan on Space Policy reflected the reorganization of 
the Cabinet Office that had started in 2008.  This reorganization allowed the Cabinet Office 
to exercise greater control over the individual ministries, especially the Ministry of 
Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, as the fourth Basic Plan on Space 
Policy was being developed.  The plan supported the U.S.-Japan alliance by applying 
resources to the whole-of-government space efforts agreed upon in the US-Japan 
Guidelines for Defense Cooperation, agreed upon in 2015.   
The government of Japan committed to expanding its programs in several space 
mission areas in the fourth Basic Plan on Space Policy.  First, the government announced 
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that it would deploy a total of seven Quasi-Zenith Satellite System PNT satellites.297 
Second, it committed JAXA and the newly formed Ministry of Defense to collaborate in 
creating a functional SSA system by the middle of 2018.  Third, the plan marked the 
government’s decision to expand the IGS constellation to 10 satellites.  Fourth, the plan 
directed JAXA and the Ministry of Defense to develop an experimental missile-warning 
satellite.  Fifth and last, it tasked JAXA with developing two types of experimental 
reconnaissance satellites, novel in their size and maneuverability.   
Kallender noted that Japan’s annual space budget would increase to roughly 5 
billion U.S. dollars annually, of which approximately 40 percent would go to defense 
programs.298 In late 2017, the Strategic Headquarters for Space Policy issued a revised 
implementation plan for the fourth Basic Plan on Space Policy.  This implementation plan 
informs the presentation of Japanese military space capabilities in part three of this chapter.   
B. HISTORICAL COLLABORATION 
The previous section introduced American contributions to Japanese rocketry in the 
late-1960s and to Japanese SATCOM in the mid-1980s.  This section looks at other areas 
of historical, space-related collaboration and interdependence affecting the defense 
establishments in Japan and the United States.  As a matter of economic policy, the Reagan 
and Bush administrations pushed for a change in Japanese trade practices during the late 
1980s.  Using Article 301 of the U.S. Trade Act of 1988, the Bush administration 
threatened to invoke wide-ranging trade sanctions on the Japanese high-technology 
industry to stop Japan from protecting its satellite industry specifically.299 This threat of 
sanctions and the negotiations that followed resulted in the Japanese government agreeing 
to permit international bidding on procurement contracts for the country’s non-research 
and development satellites.300  
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As it turned out, this trade agreement placed the Japanese government in a dilemma 
when considering how to characterize and manage the IGS program.  Based on the trade 
agreement with the United States, reached in 1990, characterizing IGS as a multi-purpose 
satellite would have opened it up to public bidding; whereas, characterizing it as a defense 
satellite was precluded by the peaceful purposes resolution passed by the Diet.301 The 
solution to the dilemma was to place the IGS program under the Cabinet Secretariat.  Over 
the coming years, this placement decision would expose shortcomings in the management 
structure for Japanese space activities, which contributed to early failures in the IGS 
program.  In turn, these failures led to calls for reform, which the Diet incorporated into 
the Basic Law for Space Policy less than three years later.  
The remainder of part two discusses recent military space collaboration between 
Japan and the United States in specific mission areas.  This includes collaboration in missile 
warning, PNT, and, most recently, SSA.  Similar to the way it had constrained Japan’s 
satellite reconnaissance program, Japanese law placed an uncommon restraint on the 
country’s options for ballistic missile defense.  In 2007, Kazuto Sazuki wrote: “The 
Japanese government has taken a unique interpretation of its Constitution Article 9, namely 
that Japan holds the right to collective defense, but will not exercise it.  If an enemy missile 
is set and ready for operation, the country would not be able to launch a counter attack 
missile unless the command comes from a Japanese early warning satellite.”302 
Nevertheless, the Japanese government followed through on its agreement to acquire 
ballistic missile defense systems from the United States in 2003.303 These systems 
consisted of the Patriot Advance Capability-3 and Standard Missile 3 Block 2A by 2010.  
Additionally, the U.S. Army established a Joint Tactical Ground System unit and an 
associated facility in Misawa, Japan in 2007 and 2008, respectively.304 Recent upgrades to 
the Joint Tactical Ground System have allowed it to directly downlink data from both DSP 
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and SBIRS satellites to warn and potentially cue supported forces in the event of a ballistic 
missile launch.305   
In 2011, Japan’s first Quasi-Zenith Satellite System PNT satellite entered into 
operation.306 Two of the Quasi-Zenith ground stations were located on U.S. islands in the 
Pacific Ocean, on Hawaii and Guam.  Japan’s National Space Policy Secretariat announced 
in March 2018 that Quasi-Zenith Satellite System services would begin operations by the 
end of the year.307 The system promises to improve PNT services to Japan beyond what 
GPS satellites provide to it currently, given Japan’s mountainous geography and built-up 
urban environments.308 
In 2013, Japan and the United States began discussions and official dialogues 
regarding SSA data sharing.309 In May 2013, Japan and the United States signed a 
memorandum of understanding as a result of which U.S. Strategic Command and NASA 
began to provide SSA data to Japan.310 In May 2014, the two countries reached an 
agreement for JAXA to provide SSA data to the United States.  Despite this progress and 
the participation of the Department of Defense in the SSA framework, the four 
Comprehensive Dialogues on Space between Japan and the United States have been largely 
civilian affairs.  Only in the joint press release from the fourth Comprehensive Dialogues 
on Space, in 2017, was the participation of the Japan Ministry of Defense and the U.S. 
Department of Defense in the talks explicitly acknowledged.311 As the Ministry of 
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Defense’s SSA network comes online in 2018 and beyond, the Japanese government plans 
to develop guidelines to further its cooperation with the United States, to include sending 
JSDF personnel to work at U.S. Strategic Command.312 
C. CURRENT MILITARY SPACE ORGANIZATION AND CAPABILITIES 
The focus of this section is Japanese organization and capabilities for military 
space.  Japan possesses or will soon possess similar military space capabilities to France.  
Therefore, this section is organized similar to the that earlier section, beginning with space-
based imagery, then proceeding to missile warning, PNT, weather, and space launch.   
According to William Radcliffe, Japan merged “the ‘Central Geography Unit’ of 
the [Ground Self-Defense Force] with the satellite imagery divisions of the other [JSDF] 
branches” to form Defense Intelligence Headquarters Imagery Directorate in 1997.313 The 
Imagery Directorate primarily exploited commercial imagery purchased from U.S. 
companies during its first few years of existence.314 By 2004, the Imagery Directorate’s 
resources had grown, however, and it was renamed the Directorate for Geospatial 
Intelligence.  At that time, the directorate employed 321 civilian and uniformed analysts.315 
These analysts specialized in three-dimensional mapping and in analyzing satellite 
imagery.316 
The Prime Minister’s Cabinet Satellite Intelligence Center is responsible for the 
IGS optical and radar imaging satellites.317 The current IGS constellation has three optical 
and four radar satellites.  The satellites reportedly have .6 m and 1 m resolution, 
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respectively.  One tracking website estimates that the IGS are employed in 93-98 degree 
inclinations at roughly 500 km altitude.318  
Two IGS are currently in development with projected launch dates in 2019 and 
2023.319 JAXA is building a data-relay satellite to support the growing number of IGS used 
to gather imagery.320 It is scheduled, too, to launch in 2019.321 Over the next decade, Japan 
will move toward a total of 10 satellites in the IGS constellation, composed of four core 
IGS satellites, four satellites currently referred to as Surveillance Capability Augmentation 
Satellites, and two data-relay satellites. 
Ground stations at Tomakomai, Akune, and Kitaura, Japan support IGS 
operations.322 A fourth IGS ground station is located near Perth, Australia.  The main 
control and analysis center is located in Tokyo on the north side of the Defense Ministry 
headquarters.  This facility is referred to as the Cabinet Satellite Intelligence Center, and it 
falls under the Cabinet Intelligence and Research Office.   
The first director of the Cabinet Satellite Intelligence Center was a retired 
general.323 Furthermore, approximately 10 percent of personnel working at the center in 
2001 were from the JSDF.  Up to 300 people may now work at the Cabinet Satellite 
Intelligence Center.324  An additional 80 personnel are likely needed to operate the four 
IGS ground stations, bringing the total number of personnel directly associated with IGS 
operations up to 380.325 
                                                 
318 NY2O.com, “Military Satellites,” accessed April 27, 2018, http://www.n2yo.com/satellites/?c=30 
&srt=1&dir=1. 
319 National Space Policy Secretariat, “Implementation Plan,” 11. 
320 National Space Policy Secretariat, “Implementation Plan,” 11. 
321 Kallender, “Japan’s New Dual,” 11.   
322 Radcliffe, “Origins and Current State,” 17-18. 
323 Radcliffe, “Origins and Current State,” 17. 
324 Radcliffe, “Origins and Current State,” 17. 
325 Radcliffe, “Origins and Current State,” 17-18. 
 76 
The Japanese government has long considered developing a space-based infrared 
sensor for missile early warning.326 Moreover, in 2014, a Japanese lawmaker and former 
chairman of the Space Policy Committee, Hiroshi Imazu, expressed a personal interest in 
the U.S. Navy’s Slow Walker program.  As part of the Slow Walker program, the U.S. 
Navy used DSP satellites data to track the movements of Soviet bombers in the 1980s.327 
In fiscal year 2020, JAXA is projected to host a prototype dual-wavelength infrared sensor 
on its Advanced Land Observing Satellite 3 in a cooperative arrangement with the Ministry 
of Defense.328 This cooperative arrangement suggests that Advanced Land Observing 
Satellite 3 may, itself, be employed as a dual-use satellite.  JAXA states that Advanced 
Land Observing Satellite 3 will operate in three modes, provide panchromatic imagery at 
up to .8 m resolution and multispectral imagery in six bands at up to 3.2 m resolution, and 
have a pointing capability of up to 60 degrees in all directions.329 
In his analysis of the Basic Plan for Space Policy, in 2016, Kallender suggests that 
Japan was also considering whether to develop satellites to gather signals intelligence.330 
However, the 2017 implementation plan makes no mention of a signals intelligence 
satellite, nor does signals intelligence figure into cooperative agreements with the United 
States, such as the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation. 
For SATCOM, Japan’s defense forces currently rely upon a combination of 
Superbird and DSN satellites.331 The two Superbird satellites are owned and operated by 
SKY Perfect JSAT Corporation.  The Ministry of Defense projects to stop using the 
Superbird-D satellite by the end of 2018.  It plans to use Superbird C-2 through 2020.  
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Superbird C-2 is located at 144 east longitude and permits SHF communications.332 In 
2013, the Ministry of Defense contracted DSN Corporation to build and operate two SHF 
satellites.333 DSN-1 is a hosted payload on Superbird-8.  Superbird-8 is a commercial 
satellite located at 162 degrees east longitude.334 It began operations in 2018 after a two-
year launch delay.  DSN-2 is a dedicated military satellite.335 It is located at 92 degrees east 
longitude, over the Indian Ocean, and began operations in 2017.336 
As mentioned in the previous section, Japan developed the Quasi-Zenith Satellite 
System to improve its access to PNT.  The Quasi-Zenith Satellite System places all four of 
its satellites in a highly-inclined geosynchronous orbit centered at 136 degrees east 
longitude.337 Each satellite achieves its maximum dwell time at 42 degrees north latitude 
to maximize coverage over Japan, before speeding through its orbit over the southern 
hemisphere.  The system’s signals are fully compatible with GPS and require no changes 
to existing GPS receivers.  The Quasi-Zenith Satellite System constellation will incorporate 
three additional satellites in fiscal year 2023, when it is scheduled to begin operations as a 
seven satellite constellation.338 This will ensure that four of the constellation’s seven 
satellites are located nearly over Japan’s mainland at any one time.    
Japan currently employs two geostationary meteorological satellites:  Himawari-8 
is the primary, and Himawari-9 operates in standby.339 They are positioned at 140.7 
degrees east longitude.340 The Japan Meteorological Agency operates the Himawari 
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satellites and works in partnership with EUMETSAT and the National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration to provide worldwide satellite weather coverage.341 
JAXA is the primary Japanese agency responsible for providing SSA data.  It 
employs the JAXA Satellite Tracking Station Network and the Bisei and Kamisaibara 
Space Guard centers to this end.342 The JAXA Satellite Tracking Station Network includes 
four domestic and four international tracking and control stations.343 The international 
stations are located at Christmas Island; Santiago, Chile; Perth, Australia; and Gran Canaria 
Island, located off the coast of West Africa.  The optical sensor at Bisei Space Guard Center 
is capable of monitoring objects a small as .8 m in diameter, located from 68 degrees east 
to 200 degrees east along the geostationary belt.344 The radar sensor at Kamisaibara Space 
Guard Center can track up to 10 objects simultaneously and is capable of tracking objects 
1 m in diameter from a range of 600 km.  According to JAXA’s SSA system project 
manager, Mayumi Matsuura, Japan plans to develop capabilities enabling JAXA to monitor 
objects .1 m in diameter in the coming years.345  
Japan currently has three separate satellite launch vehicles, with a fourth under 
development.346 Epsilon is a small, solid-fueled rocket.  It can launch up to a 450 kg 
payload into a 500 km circular orbit, in one of two optional configurations.  H-IIB is a two-
stage liquid-fueled rocket.  Its primary purpose is to launch the H-II Transfer Vehicle to 
the International Space Station.  The H-IIA is Japan’s mainstay heavy launch vehicle.  It is 
operated by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries with oversight from JAXA.  It can launch up to a 
4 metric ton payload into a geosynchronous transfer orbit.  The H3 launch vehicle is under 
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development, with its maiden flight planned for fiscal year 2020.  The H3 launch capacity 
will exceed that of the H-II rockets.  Japan aims to capture a share of the commercial space 
launch market with it. 
Japan has two space launch facilities:  Tanegashima and Uchinoura, also known as 
Kagoshima.  Both facilities are located at 31 degrees north latitude.347348 
D. ANALYSIS 
As before, part four analyzes the information uncovered in the first three parts to 
identify areas for potential military space collaboration between Japan and the United 
States.  Based on the material presented in part one, Japan has successfully consolidated 
its space leadership under the Headquarters for Space Policy in the last few years.  
Combined with the emergence of a national security strategy that recognizes the 
importance of space to Japan’s defense, this has led significant increases in spending on 
Japan’s military space capabilities.  With a budget for military space now amounting to 
approximately 2 billion U.S. dollars per year, Japan is expending about three times as much 
on military space capabilities as France is spending on it currently.   
Despite Japan’s expanding capabilities and its expressed desire to further its space-
related defense cooperation with the United States, collaboration in space between each 
country’s military establishments has still been modest.  A significant barrier to effective 
collaboration in this domain was touched upon in part B:  the idea that Article 9 of Japan’s 
constitution precluded Japan from exercising collective self-defense.  Nevertheless, a 
cabinet decision in 2014 established that Japan did indeed have the right to come to the aid 
of a close ally under attack once specific conditions had been met.  While this decision did 
not go as far as the Abe government would have liked, it led to a revision of the Guidelines 
for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation in 2015.349 In a likely reference to the space and cyber 
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domains, the guidelines indicated that Japan and the United States would respond to non-
geographic threats “that will have an important influence on Japan’s peace and security.”350 
This announcement portended greater collaboration in space, as did a statement made in 
Japan’s national security strategy regarding the Ministry of Defense increasing its focus on 
counter-intelligence.  According to the statement, Japan would expand its efforts to protect 
“Specially Designated Secrets.”351 Increased defense-related space collaboration with the 
United States would tend to result in the accumulation of a few more secrets such as these.           
Based on part C, Japan has a not-insignificant capability to image from space and 
has developed its ability to analyze satellite images for over 20 years.  This capability 
would and should provide an intelligence windfall for the United States.  Moreover, Japan 
appears to be setting itself apart from the United States’ other allies in space in working to 
develop a space-based infrared capability.  Tying into these infrared sensors would help to 
improve the United States theater missile defense.  Furthermore, as evidenced by the Quasi-
Zenith Satellite System, which maximizes PNT availability over the Japanese mainland, 
Japanese satellite systems are likely to be regionally optimized, presenting the United 
States with the opportunity to tie-in to these systems while maintaining a more globally 
optimized capability itself. 
The United States already benefits from weather data provided by Japan’s 
meteorological satellites.  Ideally, the Department of Defense would be able to use the 
space launch facilities to launch national payloads in the event of an emergency, as a means 
of providing assured access to space.   
Japan’s ability to conduct SSA appears to nearly match France’s ability.  However, 
Japan is working to develop a more integrated SSA network than it has currently, one which 
the JSDF can better utilize.  As the JSDF gains more control over and access to Japan’s 
SSA network, it will be interesting to see how SSA agreements with the United States 
develop.  In 2017, Japan participated in the “Global Sentinel” table-top exercise led by 
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U.S. Strategic Command.352 The United States’ five-eye partners, as well as France, 
Germany, Spain, Italy, and the Republic of Korea also participated.353 Given the partners 
included in the exercise, the exercise may have well involved the sharing of classified SSA 
data.  Nevertheless, the United States does not appear to have reached a long-term 
agreement to share classified SSA data with Japan, as it earlier did with Australia and 
France.  Establishing an agreement to share classified SSA data with Japan appears to be 
one of the next logical steps for the United States to take to strengthen its military 
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V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
Beginning in the early 1990s, countries around the world could observe that the 
United States used space systems to significantly increase the combat effectiveness of its 
military forces.  Potential adversaries, such as China, took note and began to develop 
strategies and means to jeopardize space assets.  The U.S. Congress responded to the 
increased threat to our valued space systems by commissioning a study in the 1999 
National Defense Authorization Act.  Released in 2001, the study set the United States on 
a path toward a National Security Space Strategy.  The United States released its first-ever 
National Security Space Strategy in 2011.  The strategy prescribed increased partnering 
with U.S. allies in response to a contested space environment.  Space policy leaders in the 
United States argued that allied partnering in space would help to ensure that the U.S. 
military’s space capabilities were resilient to attack, and that this resiliency would deter 
attacks on our space assets in the first place.  Although some scholars began to challenge 
the success of the 2011 National Security Space Strategy in creating a framework that 
deterred aggressive action in space in later years, the question of whether the strategy was 
effectively fostering allied collaboration in space was largely absent from their critiques.  
As a result, this thesis set out to determine the mission areas in which the United States 
was partnering with its military allies in space and how the United States might benefit 
from operating as a coalition space force.       
A. CASE STUDIES 
This thesis took a case study approach to answer the central research question, 
examining the evolution, efforts at collaboration, and military space capabilities of three of 
the United States’ closest spacefaring allies:  France, Australia, and Japan.  One of the most 
remarkable findings of this analysis was how similar the paths of these three countries had 
been relative to one another in the military space domain from 2008 onward.  France and 
Australia explicitly recognized the importance of space operations to their military 
operations in the national defense strategies that they released in the 2008-2009 timeframe.  
In 2008, Japan signaled the growing importance of space to its military as well by revising 
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its Basic Space Law.  In the period following the global financial crisis in 2009, however, 
each country failed to follow through on its proposed investments in military space systems 
in the way that it had envisioned just a few years prior.  But these failures, ironically, helped 
to bring organizational reforms to fruition in each country at about the same time.  These 
reforms moved Australia ever closer to a national space agency; whereas France developed 
a military space command; and Japan developed a space policy headquarters in the Cabinet 
Office.  Moreover, by 2016, each of the countries had developed mechanisms to ensure 
that its planned investments in military space capabilities were fully funded.  Thus, by the 
end of 2017, all three countries were largely developing the military space capabilities that 
they had envisioned a decade prior. 
This chapter revisits the findings of the case studies, focusing on the mission areas 
where collaboration between the United States and one of more of the countries has 
occurred.  It briefly discusses the collaboration’s motivations and the benefits to help 
answer the question, “How might the United States benefit from coalition operations in 
space?”  The author then analyzes the Department of Defense's International Space 
Cooperation Strategy (ISCS) to compare the ends and means of collaboration that it 
prescribes with the findings from the case studies.  Released to the public in May 2017, the 
Department of Defense ISCS flows from the 2011 National Security Space Strategy but 
reflects more recent thinking on the subject of space cooperation in the Department of 
Defense.  The chapter and the overall thesis conclude with suggestions for future research.   
1. SSA 
The Department of Defense’s success in signing SSA-sharing agreements with as 
many governments as it did over the past eight years may represent its crowning 
achievement in space cooperation.  By November 2017, U.S. Strategic Command had 
succeeded in signing SSA-sharing agreements with a total of 17 countries.354  The timing 
of these agreements was a significant aspect of their success:  at the same time that the 
                                                 




space domain was growing in importance in the minds of the military leaders in each of 
these 17 countries, the Department of Defense found common cause with these leaders and 
the countries they represented.  The title of a Space News article covering events from the 
34th Space Symposium captures a critical result of these SSA-sharing agreements, 
explaining “International SSA agreements could pave the way for further space 
cooperation.”355 The case of France provides a quintessential example of how this increase 
in cooperation can occur, as France moved from a basic SSA-sharing agreement, to an 
advanced agreement, and then to combined space operations with the United States.  In 
addition to building relationships, the SSA-agreements have proliferated the space 
surveillance sensors that the Department of Defense receives data from globally.  Over the 
last several years, U.S. Strategic Command has leveraged its commercial relationships with 
Lockheed Martin to lead the “Global Sentinel” exercise, which plans for the operational 
use of a combined, global SSA network among the United States and several of its allies.356  
2. SATCOM 
Although space surveillance may be the most talked-about means of collaboration, 
SATCOM represents one of the most enduring means.  SATCOM helps to satisfy a 
fundamental military requirement to “shoot, move, and communicate,” by providing 
communications well removed from any ground-based infrastructure.  As a result of this 
functionality, NATO has well-established specifications for member states to build their 
military telecommunications satellites to.  Similarly, Japan purchased terminals to link to 
U.S. military SATCOM before it started using any other military satellite capability.   
The United States now has several international partners in the WGS program.357   
Geostationary SATCOM is typically the most cost-effective means of acquiring 
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bandwidth, but the bandwidth is decidedly localized.  By reaching an agreement for 
Australia to provide the funds for WGS-6, Australia and United States resolved this 
conundrum in a way that was amenable to both parties.  Australia gained worldwide access 
to SHF communications at the cost of a single geostationary satellite, while the United 
States got more SHF bandwidth and a more resilient constellation than it would have 
otherwise.  Australia was recently waiting on the United States to conduct an analysis of 
alternatives of its future SATCOM architecture before making its own acquisitions 
decisions.     
3. Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
The Department of Defense may still owe a debt of gratitude to the U.S. Geological 
Survey and NASA for their role in the development of Landsat-1 and the sharing of 
Landsat images in the 1960s and 1970s.  France got its start at imagery analysis using 
Landsat images, before developing and exploiting its own dual-use SPOT satellites.  Prior 
to developing IGS, Japan analyzed images from Landsat and SPOT satellites.  In the early 
1990s, the Department of Defense acquired Eagle Vision to download SPOT images, and 
it has been using and distributing commercial imagery to friendly foreign military forces 
ever since.   
Australia now acquires its satellite imagery from a U.S. commercial company, 
images which it can analyze and provide back to the U.S. military as it desires.  In this 
regard, the United States may stand to gain more from the expertise and focus of the 
imagery analysts in countries such as France, Australia, and Japan than it does from the 
actual number of raw images that these countries’ satellites can provide.  It helps if this 
analysis is in English, of course. 
4. PNT
           Australia, France, and Japan have all worked on developing PNT systems, with the 
work of each country benefiting the U.S. military in some form.  Australia assisted the 
United States in testing of the GPS program, providing both manpower and a location in 
the southern hemisphere to conduct tests from.  France contributed to the development of 
an independent European PNT capability, which provides a redundant capability to GPS.  
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Japan developed a regionally-focused PNT system that is fully compatible with GPS.  
Japan’s system will begin operations as a 4-satellite constellation later in 2018.  While none 
of this work will ensure PNT availability in the event of intentional jamming, each 
country’s contributions provides a modicum of benefit to the Department of Defense.      
5. Missile Warning and Defense
Australia has participated in the U.S. missile defense network for over 50 years.  
Along with the agreements on communications intelligence, the existence of joint U.S.-
Australian space research facilities in Australia has contributed significantly to Australia’s 
overall security relationship with the United States.  This close relationship has not always 
been a good thing, as Australian is only now beginning to devote two percent of its GDP 
to defense expenditures.  Nevertheless, recent Australian investments in the Mission 
Processor to download SBIRS data make it a more capable ally in terms of traditional 
military operations, since this information can contribute to the sound tactical employment 
of Australian forces.  Furthermore, Australia has practiced integrating missile-warning data 
provided by the United States into its missile defense network since the 1990s.  Unlike 
Australia, Japan is investing in an independent missile-warning satellite system.  This 
capability could also benefit U.S. forces deployed in the region, either through tactical 
integration or by simply contributing to their security.    
6. Weather
None of militaries in these case studies appeared to exercise direct control over 
weather satellites.  However, U.S. forces have still benefited from weather data that the 
Japan Meteorological Agency and EUMETSAT satellites provide.  Moreover, as a result 
of its working relationship with EUMETSAT, the U.S. Air Force deferred investment in a 
meteorological satellite that would have provided weather data over the Indian Ocean.  
Unfortunately, the situation ended on a sour note when EUMETSAT decided not to replace 
the satellite that the Air Force was using at the end of its design life.   
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7. Space Launch 
The United States provided Japan with technology that helped it to develop a heavy-
lift satellite launch capability despite U.S. policy barring international assistance in this 
mission area.  The United States pursued collaboration in this area to promote Japanese 
prestige, thereby contributing to the strategic messaging of a U.S. ally.   
B. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ISCS 
This section analyzes the Department of Defense ISCS in terms of ends, ways, and 
means; it then discusses the relevance of this thesis’ findings to the implementation plan 
that the ISCS directs.  The Department of Defense ISCS clearly establishes mission 
assurance as one end of international space cooperation.358 Four more ends are also buried 
within the first several pages of the document: overcoming constrained resources or 
promoting sustainability; operating more efficiently and effectively in a coalition 
environment; assured access; and promoting U.S. national security interests.  The single 
overarching way in which the U.S. Department of Defense will achieve international space 
cooperation is through multi-domain interoperability.  The document prescribes advancing 
this interoperability in six different areas:  legal, policy, doctrinal, and operational 
principles; technology research and development; acquisition and production; technology 
and information sharing; techniques, tactics, and procedures relating to space operations; 
and education, training, and exchanges of personnel.   The means associated with these 
ends are partners’ and allies’ space-related capabilities.   
This thesis has shown that the United States has employed the strategy set forth in 
the current Department of Defense ISCS in the past.  This knowledge should inspire 
confidence in the Department of Defense components that its international partners and 
allies possess the necessary political leadership, milestones, capabilities, and trust in 
handling sensitive information for the components to develop realistic and achievable 
implementation plans that can contribute to the United States’ overall deterrence strategy.  
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Furthermore, there appears to be room for growth in international space cooperation in the 
immediate future in regards to doctrine and organization, know-how, capabilities, and trust, 
with attendant benefits to U.S. security.          
C. SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
At the doctrinal and organizational level, the components of the Department of 
Defense are currently fleshing out their concepts for multi-domain battle.  This can be seen 
in the recent development of the Multi-Domain Battle concept in the Army and the 
establishment of the Deputy Commandant for Information and Marine Expeditionary Force 
Information Groups in the Marine Corps, among other initiatives across the services.  
Similarly, space control doctrine is actively being refined, although the National Space 
Defense Center has yet to achieve its full manning levels.  Our international partners can 
be integral to these developments or, as is occurring mostly, they can be integrated into it 
after the fact.  Either way, the Department of Defense ISCS envisions incorporating allied 
and partner capabilities into doctrine and organizations that do not yet fully exist.  As these 
rapidly developing doctrines and organizations take shape, so too can the relationship of 
our international partners to them.            
With regard to know-how, little evidence was uncovered in the case studies of our 
international allies being incorporated into our training and educational institutions to learn 
about space.  One reason for this may be that space education poses security challenges 
less inherent to other areas of study.  For example, policy at the Naval Postgraduate School 
dictates that international students not be given access to any confidential information, 
including information that is classified as “For Official Use Only.” Nevertheless, the 
Department of Defense ISCS seemingly envisions cooperation with our trusted partners 
and allies at much higher security levels than that.  Revisiting security policy at Department 
of Defense training and educational institutions may make the courses of instruction more 
inviting to our international partners and allies with whom we desire further cooperation in 
space.   
France and Japan are developing new Intelligence, Surveillance, and 
Reconnaissance capabilities not previously possessed by our allies.  Some thought should 
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be given to how to these new systems can complement our existing and planned ELINT 
and missile-warning architectures.   
In regard to launch capability, the National Space Transportation Policy permits 
U.S. government payloads to be launched on space vehicles manufactured outside the 
United States by exception.359 The policy also permits the U.S. government to launch 
foreign-manufactured vehicles and technology on a case-by-case basis.   The processes for 
launching a close ally’s defense satellite from a U.S. government site as well as for 
launching a U.S. defense asset from an appropriately secure foreign site could be better 
understood by all parties involved and streamlined.  This would help to ensure assured 
access to space for both the United States and its spacefaring allies.     
Finally, the Fiscal Year 2019 National Defense Authorization Act is anticipated to 
direct the Department of Commerce rather than the Department of Defense to assume 
responsibility for providing SSA services to foreign governments by 2024.360 The SSA-
sharing agreements that the Department of Defense has signed with 17 countries since 2010 
have helped it to establish a common ground with these countries’ militaries from which 
to work toward coalition space operations.  With the Department of Commerce assuming 
some of the Department of Defense’s present responsibility for engaging with foreign 
governments, the Department of Defense would do well to consider how to make the most 
out of the authority that it currently possesses.  This forethought will help to ensure that it 
continues to engage with new partners and build mutual levels of trust and interoperability 
with existing ones as this change takes place.  
D. CONCLUSION 
This thesis has analyzed and further developed the notion that the Department of 
Defense has to continue to work to collaborate successfully with its spacefaring friends and 
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allies.  Fortunately, the Department of Defense has proven its ability to collaborate 
successfully in space-related endeavors in the past, as this thesis has shown.  Compared to 
the past, however, international recognition that space systems have become critical to 
military operational effectiveness has grown in recent years.  This realization has increased 
international demand for a variety of space and space-related capabilities and increased the 
likelihood that future military conflict will extend into space as well.  In light of these 
changes to the operating environment, the Department of Defense has begun pursuing even 
greater interoperability in space with our friends and allies to make the most out of each 
country’s scarce resources and increase their awareness of the space environment.   To the 
extent that the Department of Defense achieves this interoperability while maintaining an 
appropriate level of operational security, it will provide the United States with an 
asymmetric military advantage over its near-peer competitors, Russia and China, for whom 
such collaboration appears highly unlikely.361  
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